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Abstract
Faceted Information Flow
by
Thomas Schmitz
This thesis aims to make progress on the problem of using dynamic information
flow control for computer security at the application level, specifically using Faceted
Values. This technique involves augmenting program data values so that each one
is a pair of two primitive values: one high-security version that is visible only to
high-security observers, and one low-security version that is visible to everyone
else. These augmented values are called faceted values, and the various versions
are called facets. This technique allows very precise tracking of information flow
through a program, allowing programmers to increase confidence in the security of
their systems.
This thesis helps to increase the maturity of research on the “Faceted Values”
technique, bringing it in line with research on the prior techniques “No Sensitive
Upgrades” and “Secure Multi Execution.” Specifically, we have formalized a
new semantics (called Multef) and proved that it satisfies a strong (“termination
sensitive”) security property, we have implemented the technique as a Haskell
library (called FIO) using two monads, and we have tested it in a prototype social
network application (called FacetBook).
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
To motivate this thesis, we should look at all the buggy software out there with
unmet security requirements. Consider social media (blog, forum, Facebook, etc.),
banking software, search engines (issues with privacy), web mashups (webpages
with advertisements, and generally any software that combines functionality of
multiple services), and various kinds of shared database (Google Drive, confer-
ence management systems, etc.). Such software is often developed without any
systematic methodology for guaranteeing security. This application level security
contrasts with lower level system security (e.g. in operating systems and in hard-
ware) because it is practical to sacrifice some runtime performance for improved
confidence in security.
The word “security” means different things to different people. Here, we focus
specifically on information flow security. Information flow policies [10, 4, 7] specify
that a particular restricted class of data shall not flow to particular restricted
output channels. Many software security requirements can be phrased in this way,
and so we consider how such policies may be enforced.
1
1.1 Background
We begin with a brief review of some prior work on information flow control.
1.1.1 Security lattices
It is common to use lattices to specify information flow policies [4]. The security
lattice is a set of labels, and we denote the lattice’s partial order using the symbol
v. Each label in the lattice represents an information class. Information from one
class may flow to another as long as the direction of flow is upward through the
lattice; all other flows are prohibited.
1.1.2 Dynamic information flow control
After writing a policy (using a lattice), we would like to enforce the policy
when running code. Most enforcement mechanisms are classified either as static
or as dynamic. Static mechanisms (such as Jif [9]) analyze the program itself;
dynamic mechanisms (such as LIO [14]) analyze the execution of the program.
Because they perform the analysis at runtime, dynamic mechanisms expose
information flow violations later and exhibit worse runtime performance than static
mechanisms do. On the other hand, dynamic techniques can offer better precision
by exploiting observations about the program’s runtime behavior. We focus on
dynamic techniques for application level security, where the advantage of precision
outweighs the disadvantage of performance.
Compared to other dynamic analysis techniques, dynamic information flow
control is unusual because a single execution cannot constitute an information flow
violation; rather, to exhibit a violation, we must compare at least two executions
to one another. Therefore, dynamic techniques either enforce a conservative
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approximation of the desired policy or execute (parts of) the program multiple
times.
1.1.3 No Sensitive Upgrades
No Sensitive Upgrades (NSU) [1, 14, 15] is a technique that involves labeling
data values during program execution. Every value is either labeled H for restricted
“high security” data or labeled L for unrestricted “low security” data. The labels
allow tracking which values contain information about the restricted data. (For
simplicity of exposition, we assume that the security lattice is {L,H} with L @ H.)
Dually, every output channel is either labeled L for restricted “low security” output
channels or labeled H for unrestricted “high security” output channels.
During computation, the mechanism propagates labels from input values to
output values. For example:
1 var x = 12345; // A secret number
2 var y = x % 2; // Get a bit of info about x
3 print(y); // A public output channel
Given that the output channel print is labeled L, the above code fails on line 3
because the label H propagates from x to y, and print cannot accept arguments
labeled H. This type of information propagation is an explicit flow.
Information can also propagate via the conditional presence or absence of side
effects, such as assigning to variables, throwing exceptions, or printing to the
console; we call these implicit flows. To track implicit flows, the NSU mechanism
keeps a global program counter label (PC), which indicates whether the restricted
data has influenced the current control flow path. For example:
1 var x = 12345; // A secret number
3
2 if(x % 2 == 1) { // PC label becomes H
3 print("I'm odd!"); // A public output channel
4 } // PC label becomes L
Program constants (such as the string "I’m odd!") acquire their labels from the
program counter, so in the above code, the label H propagates from x to the
program counter on line 2, and then from the program counter to the constant
string "I’m odd!" on line 3. Thus, the program fails on line 3, much like before.
Note that this program would not fail if the secret number were even instead of
odd; in the present discussion, we consider this behavior to be acceptably secure,
although Section 1.2.2 describes enforcement mechanisms where attackers cannot
infer information from mechanism failures.
Some implicit flows are harder to catch. We must analyze how information
may be deduced when a side effect is not executed. It is infeasible to consider
all skipped execution paths, but we can detect cases where the current execution
path leaks information to other paths; in particular, we detect when a side effect
upgrades the label of a value during a sensitive execution context (i.e., when the
current program counter label is H). This example (adapted from [6]) illustrates
the necessity of this check:
1 var x = 12345; // A secret number
2 var y = 0;
3 var z = 1;
4 if(x % 2 == 1) { // PC label becomes H
5 y = 1; // Sensitive upgrade occurs here
6 }
7 if(y == 0) {
8 z = 0;
4
9 }
10 print(z);
Without the NSU mechanism, the above program would (indirectly) write the
least significant bit of the secret number into the variable z and subsequently print
it. Explicitly, if the value of x were 0, then the program would print 0; if the value
of x were 1, then the program would print 1.
However, the NSU mechanism detects the sensitive upgrade on line 5, and the
program fails. Again, note that the program would not fail if the secret number
were even instead of odd.
There are multiple ways to implement the mechanism to fail after detecting a
sensitive upgrade. The classic choice is to diverge (i.e., to go into an infinite loop),
thus preventing any use of leaked information. Another option (proposed by [6])
is to suppress the side effect (i.e., updating the value of y) and continue execution,
though this may yield unexpected results.
This enforcement mechanism yields false positives: not all programs with
sensitive upgrades are actually insecure. For example:
1 var x = 12345; // A secret number
2 var y;
3 if(x % 2 == 1) { // PC label becomes H
4 y = "I'm odd!"; // Sensitive upgrade occurs here
5 } else {
6 y = "I'm even!";
7 }
The above program is secure because it prints nothing to the public output channel,
but the mechanism fails on line 4 due to the sensitive upgrade.
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Due to such false positives, NSU lacks a desirable property called precision; we
say that an enforcement mechanism is precise if it does not alter the behavior of
any secure programs, which are programs that already satisfy the desired policy.
1.1.4 Secure Multi Execution
The Secure Multi Execution (SME) mechanism [5] runs the program twice:
• The high execution runs in a sandbox where it is legal to read the restricted
(H) data but illegal to write to the restricted (L) output channel.
• The low execution runs in a sandbox where it is illegal to read the restricted
(H) data but legal to write to the restricted (L) output channel.
This technique is clearly secure because it is explicitly impossible for the restricted
(H) data to flow to the restricted (L) output channel.
SME is also precise—it does not alter the behavior of any secure programs. In
particular, the low execution produces the correct output on the restricted channel;
the high execution produces correct output on all other output channels. This is
in contrast with NSU, which fails on some secure programs.
SME can easily support internal program effects (e.g., assigning to variables
and throwing exceptions) because the effects are local to one execution and do
not need to propagate to the second execution. On the other hand, externally
visible effects (e.g., printing to the console) are clearly duplicated. To cope with
this, we must partition outside observers into low security observers and high
security observers, and we must arrange the execution environment so that the
low security observers see only the effects of the first execution, while the high
security observers see only those of the second.
Another problem is that the performance overhead can be quite large. Executing
the program twice takes about twice as much time. When using SME to enforce
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multiple information flow policies on a single program, the runtime overhead is
exponential in the number of policies. However, we expect that much of this
computation is redundant, which leads us to the next technique.
1.1.5 Faceted Values
The Faceted Values (FV) mechanism augments the program data values so
that each one is a pair of two primitive values: one high security version that is
visible only to high security observers, and one low security version that is visible
to everyone else. These augmented values are called faceted values, and the various
versions are called facets. If the two facets of a value are identical, then we can
optimize the representation by collapsing the pair to a single primitive value.
When a faceted value is used during program execution, then the execution
must bifurcate into two separate executions, one for each facet. When the sub-
executions complete, the mechanism combines their results into a new faceted
value and continues the remainder of the program as a single execution.
To properly handle side effects, we need a program counter data structure
(typically called pc), which tracks whether the execution has bifurcated, and if so,
which of the two sub-executions is currently running. By tracking this information,
the mechanism can correctly decide whether to perform the effect for low observers
or for high observers. If the execution has not bifurcated, then both effects occur.
FV includes special support for mutable reference cells. Rather than main-
taining two stores separately, the mechanism puts faceted values into the unique
global store. When updating a reference cell, the pc dictates which one (or both)
of the two facets should change.
Overall, this technique resembles SME because parts of the program execute
twice. However, the performance characteristics differ because some parts execute
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only once.
FV also resembles NSU. If we use a special “undefined” token for the public facet
of every faceted value, then the two mechanisms behave analogously until a sensitive
upgrade occurs. At this point, FV continues execution by updating the public
facets as necessary (thus deviating from the public-facets-must-be-“undefined”
discipline), whereas NSU conservatively aborts the program.
1.1.6 Richer lattices
As described so far, each of the three techniques supports just a two-element
security lattice. It is easy to generalize NSU and SME to support an arbitrary
security lattice with n elements: for NSU, we can use n different labels instead of
just two; for SME, we can execute the program n times instead of just twice.
It is known [2] that FV generalizes easily to support power set lattices, simply
by orthogonally composing multiple copies of the two-element lattice mechanism.
We have shown [11] that the technique can also support arbitrary lattices. This
result is intuitive because FV has the same semantics as SME, which itself supports
arbitrary lattices.
When using FV with a two-element lattice, there are three legal values for the
pc:
• pc = HL, which means that the execution has not bifurcated and thus we
are currently simulating both views at the same time;
• pc = H, which means that we are currently simulating only the high security
view; and
• pc = L, which means that we are currently simulating only the low security
view.
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The salient information contained in pc is the set of views currently being simulated.
There is one view for each lattice element, so the generalized pc data structure
should denote a set of views (lattice elements) containing the ones currently being
simulated.
Rather than representing a faceted value as a pair of primitive values (one for
each of the two views), we can instead represent a faceted value as a function that
maps lattice elements to primitive values (so again we have one for each view). In
the semantics (and in the Haskell prototype implementation), we represent these
functions as binary decision trees with lattice elements at the nodes and primitive
values at the leaves.
1.2 Structure of the dissertation
This thesis is organized into three self-contained chapters. Each chapter focuses
exclusively on one topic, and they can be read in any order.
1.2.1 Overview of Chapter 2: Faceted Dynamic Informa-
tion Flow via Control and Data Monads
We have implemented FV as a Haskell library called FIO [12]. The library design
includes two monads: one (called FIO) for encapsulating side effects (as is typical
in Haskell), and surprisingly a second one (called Faceted) for encapsulating the
faceted values. FIO resembles Haskell’s built-in IO monad, but offers only a subset
of the functionality—namely, mutable reference cells and file I/O, for which we
have designed suitably secure algorithms with proofs of noninterference [2]. Fac
forms a monad because faceted values support the three necessary operations:
• return :: a -> Faceted a creates a faceted value where all viewers see
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the same facet;
• fmap :: (a -> b) -> Faceted a -> Faceted b changes the facets of a
faceted value by applying a function uniformly to each facet, preserving the
required property that information from one facet cannot influence another
facet; and
• join :: Faceted (Faceted a) -> Faceted a reinterprets a faceted value
with faceted values in its facets by aggregating all of the facets of the latter
faceted values into a single faceted value, preserving the labels protecting
each facet.
To enable interactions between the two monads, the library provides a prod [8]
function:
prod :: Faceted (FIO (Faceted a)) -> FIO (Faceted a)
This function enables the execution of computations that depend on faceted
information—in other words, faceted computations. The resulting execution
bifurcates if necessary when running those computations.
1.2.2 Overview of Chapter 3: Faceted Secure Multi Exe-
cution
Each mechanism mentioned so far satisfies a formal correctness criterion called
termination insensitive noninterference (TINI). This criterion states:
• If we execute a program with two different but indistinguishable inputs and
thusly obtain two outputs, then the two outputs should also be indistinguish-
able.
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Here, we say that two values are indistinguishable when their censored versions are
equal. The censored version of a value is obtained just by replacing its restricted
data with non-informative default data.
The above criterion is called termination insensitive because divergent program
executions are exempted from consideration, as they do not produce outputs. Each
mechanism described so far [1, 5, 2] guarantees TINI.
Alternatively, if we rephrase the criterion so that divergence is considered a
possible program output, then the new criterion is called termination sensitive
noninterference (TSNI). Explicitly, TSNI specifies that if the program diverges on
one input, then it should also diverge on the other (indistinguishable) input:
• If we execute a program with two different but indistinguishable inputs,
then the two resulting behaviors (either convergence to a specific value or
divergence) should also be indistinguishable.
TSNI is strictly stronger than TINI, which means that fewer programs satisfy the
TSNI criterion.
Previous work [13, 5] on both NSU and SME has adapted them to offer TSNI.
This work aims to adapt FV likewise.
The extension of NSU guarantees TSNI, but at the cost of a new programming
model involving concurrency. Many existing programs do not work as written
because they are not written as concurrent programs.
SME can also guarantee TSNI, namely by running the multiple executions
concurrently.
To extend FV to offer TSNI, we developed a new technique called Faceted
Secure Multi Execution (FSME), which runs the two parts concurrently when the
mechanism bifurcates. However, it becomes tricky to join the subcomputations,
which means waiting for both subcomputations to complete before executing
11
their shared continuation. Joining may be unsafe because then the subsequent low
continuation would depend on the termination of the current high subcomputation.
We propose that when a subcomputation completes, it should wait at most
T seconds for the other subcomputation to complete, where T is a configurable
parameter of the system. If the other subcomputation completes before T seconds
have elapsed, then they join and the continuation will execute as normal; otherwise,
if the T seconds expire, then the two subcomputations will not join at all: instead,
each thread will execute the continuation when ready to do so. In the latter case,
the continuation will execute a total of two times instead of just one time.
When using T = 0, the mechanism is identical to SME (modulo lazy spawning)
because the system will eventually have spawned one thread for each lattice
element, and none of these threads will ever join together (we call this variation
demand-driven SME). On the other hand, when T =∞, the mechanism is identical
to (TINI) FV because every bifurcation will join before executing the continuation.
The resulting system (with positive finite T ) satisfies the TSNI criterion and
enjoys most of the performance advantages of FV. We have produced a Haskell
library and a formal semantics with a proof of TSNI. To validate its usefulness, we
have developed ProtectedBox, a secure file hosting API that supports third party
plugins, which add functionality without compromising security. We developed
three plugins for ProtectedBox:
• The comments plugin allows users to add comments to the files in the cloud.
• The tarball plugin allows users to create archive files that aggregate the
contents of multiple other files.
• The checksum plugin computes a checksum for each file in the cloud.
In this experimental application using these plugins, we verified that FSME does
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not noticeably degrade performance.
1.2.3 Overview of Chapter 4: FacetBook
To validate the usefulness of FV in general and of our Haskell library FIO in
particular, we have created a prototype social networking website called FacetBook.
Social networking websites inherently involve interactions among many people,
so the information flow security requirements are complex. Since FV can handle
complex requirements, a social networking application is a good choice to illustrate
its usefulness. Recent research (and recent events) point to the importance both of
social media itself [3] and of social media security particularly [16], so it interested
us to investigate how FV can improve the state of the art.
We created two implementations of FacetBook: one ordinary Haskell imple-
mentation and a second Haskell implementation using the FIO library. The first
implementation has fewer lines of code in total, but the second implementation
has fewer lines of code in the trusted computing base (TCB), which is the part of
the code that must be carefully examined in order to convince oneself that the
code meets the security requirements. Smaller TCBs are easier to audit, and so
by building an application with a reduced TCB, we illustrate that FV helps to
improve confidence in security.
1.3 Future directions
With the theoretical underpinnings lain out in this thesis, future work can focus
on the practical issues of implementing specific applications. In the worst case,
the number of bifurcations during faceted execution equals the size of the security
lattice (or is unbounded in the case of infinite lattices), so we anticipate optimization
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techniques for limiting the necessary number of bifurcations. In other work [11], we
present some theoretical optimization ideas where at most one bifurcation occurs
at each conditional control structure. Additional engineering effort can reduce the
performance overhead of managing large numbers of bifurcations.
Debugging tools specific to faceted execution would help programmers under-
stand when and why their code bifurcates. This understanding will help auditors
in verifying the correctness of the security policy and will help programmers to
optimize their code by manually reducing bifurcations.
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Chapter 2
Faceted Dynamic Information
Flow via Control and Data
Monads
Abstract An application that fails to ensure information flow security may leak
sensitive data such as passwords, credit card numbers, or medical records. News
stories of such failures abound. Austin and Flanagan[2] introduce faceted values –
values that present different behavior according to the privilege of the observer – as
a dynamic approach to enforce information flow policies for an untyped, imperative
λ-calculus.
We implement faceted values as a Haskell library, elucidating their relationship
to types and monadic imperative programming. In contrast to previous work,
our approach does not require modification to the language runtime. In addition
to pure faceted values, our library supports faceted mutable reference cells and
secure facet-aware socket-like communication. This library guarantees information
flow security, independent of any vulnerabilities or bugs in application code. The
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library uses a control monad in the traditional way for encapsulating effects, but it
also uniquely uses a second data monad to structure faceted values. To illustrate
a non-trivial use of the library, we present a bi-monadic interpreter for a small
language that illustrates the interplay of the control and data monads.
2.1 Introduction
When writing a program that manipulates sensitive data, the programmer
must prevent misuse of that data, intentional or accidental. For example, when
one enters a password on a web form, the password should be communicated to the
site, but not written to disk. Unfortunately, enforcing these kinds of information
flow policies is problematic. Developers primarily focus on correct functionality;
security properties are prioritized only after an attempted exploit.
Just as memory-safe languages relieve developers from reasoning about memory
management (and the host of bugs resulting from its mismanagement), information
flow analysis enforces security properties in a systemic fashion. Information
flow controls require a developer to mark sensitive information, but otherwise
automatically prevent any “leaks” of this data. Formally, we call this property
noninterference; that is, public outputs do not depend on private inputs1.
Secure multi-execution [9, 16, 23] is a relatively recent and popular information
flow enforcement technique. A program execution is split into two versions: the
“high” execution has access to sensitive information, but may only write to private
channels; the “low” execution may write to public channels, but cannot access any
sensitive information. This elegant approach ensures noninterference.
1We refer to sensitive values as “private” and non-sensitive values as “public”, as confidentiality
is generally given more attention in the literature on information flow analysis. However, the
same mechanism can also enforce integrity properties, such as that trusted outputs are not
influenced by untrusted inputs.
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Faceted evaluation is a technique for simulating secure multi-execution with a
single process, using special faceted values that contain both a public view and
a private view of the data. With this approach, a single execution can provide
many of the same guarantees that secure multi-execution provides, while achieving
better performance.
This paper extends the ideas of faceted values from an untyped variant of the
λ-calculus [2] to Haskell and describes the implementation of faceted values as a
Haskell library. This approach provides a number of benefits and insights.
First, whereas prior work on faceted values required the development of a new
language semantics, we show how to incorporate faceted values within an existing
language via library support.
Second, faceted values fit surprisingly well (but with some subtleties) into
Haskell’s monadic structure. As might be expected, we use an IO-like monad called
FIO to support imperative updates and I/O operations. We also use a second type
constructor Faceted to describe faceted values; for example, the faceted value
〈k ? 3 : 4〉 has type Faceted Int. Somewhat surprisingly, Faceted turns out to
also be a monad, with natural definitions of the corresponding operations that
satisfy the monad axioms [33]. These two monads, FIO and Faceted, naturally
interoperate via an associated product function [17] that supports switching from
the FIO monad to the Faceted monad when necessary (as described in more detail
below).
This library guarantees the traditional information flow security property of
termination-insensitive noninterference, independent of any bugs, vulnerabilities,
or malicious code in the client application.
Finally we present an application of this library in the form of an interpreter for
the imperative λ-calculus with I/O. This interpreter validates the expressiveness
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of the Faceted library; it also illustrates how the FIO and Faceted monads flow
along control paths and data paths respectively.
In summary, this paper contributes the following:
• We present the first formulation of faceted values and computations in a
typed context.
• We show how to integrate faceted values into a language as a library, rather
than by modifying the runtime environment.
• We clarify the relationship between explicit flows in pure calculations (via
the Faceted monad) and implicit flows in impure computations (via the FIO
monad).
• Finally, we present an interpreter for an imperative λ-calculus with dynamic
information flow. The security of the implementation is guaranteed by
our library. Notably, this interpreter uses the impure monad (FIO) in the
traditional way to structure computational effects, and uses the pure faceted
monad (Faceted) to structure values.
2.2 Review of Information Flow and Faceted Val-
ues
In traditional information flow systems, information is tagged with a label to
mark it as confidential to particular parties. For instance, if we need to restrict
pin to bank, we might write:
pin = 4321bank
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To protect this value, we must prevent unauthorized viewers from observing it,
directly or indirectly. In particular, we must defend against explicit flows where a
confidential value is directly assigned to a public variable, and implicit flows where
an observer may deduce a confidential value by reasoning about the program’s
control flow. The following code shows an explicit flow from pin to the variable x.
pin = 4321bank
x = pin + 1
Taint tracking – in languages such as Perl and Ruby – suffices to track straight-
forward explicit flows; in contrast, implicit flows are more subtle. Continuing our
example, consider the following code, which uses a mutable IORef.
do above2K ← newIORef False
if (pin > 2000)
then writeIORef above2K True
else return ()
This code illustrates a simple implicit flow. After it runs, the value of above2K
will reflect information about pin, even though the code never directly assigns the
value of pin to above2K. There are several proposed strategies for handling these
types of flows:
1. Allow the update, but mark above2K as sensitive because it was changed in
a sensitive context. This strategy can help for auditing information flows
“in the wild” [15], but it fails to guarantee noninterference, as shown in the
Naive column of Figure 2.1 (note that the naive computation results in True
when x is True).
2. Disallow the update to above2K within the context of the sensitive conditional
pin. When enforced at runtime, this technique becomes the no-sensitive-
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upgrade strategy [35, 1] illustrated in the NSU column of Figure 2.1. Note
that while this technique maintains noninterference, it also terminates the
program prematurely.
3. Ignore the update to above2K in a sensitive context, an approach first used
by Fenton [11]. This strategy guarantees noninterference by sacrificing
correctness (the program’s result may not be internally consistent). We show
this strategy in the Fenton column of Figure 2.1.
Faceted values introduce a third aspect to sensitive data. In addition to the
sensitive value and its label, the following faceted value includes a default public
view of ‘0000’.
pin = 〈bank ? 4321 : 0000〉
Then, when we run the previous program with this faceted pin, the value of
above2K is 〈bank ? True : False〉. The bank sees the sensitive value True, but
an unauthorized viewer instead sees the default value False, giving a consistent
picture to the unauthorized viewer while still protecting sensitive data.
Label-based information flow systems reason about multiple principals by
joining labels together (e.g. 3A+4B = 7AB). In a similar manner, faceted evaluation
nests faceted values to represent multiple principals, essentially constructing a
tree2 mapping permissions to values:
〈k1 ? 3 : 0〉+ 〈k2 ? 4 : 0〉 = 〈k1 ? 〈k2 ? 7 : 3〉 : 〈k2 ? 4 : 0〉〉
Figure 2.1, adapted from Austin and Flanagan [2], demonstrates a classic
2Alternatively, a faceted value can be interpreted as a function mapping sets of labels to
values, and the syntax above as merely a compact representation.
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code snippet first introduced by Fenton [11]. The example uses two conditional
statements to evade some information flow controls. When this code runs, the
private value x leaks into the public variable z. We represent the input x, a
confidential boolean value, in faceted notation as 〈k ? False : ⊥〉 for false and
〈k ? True : ⊥〉 for true, where ⊥ means roughly ‘undefined’. Boolean reference
cells y and z are initialized to True; by default, they are public to maximize the
permissiveness of these values.
When the input x is 〈k ? False : ⊥〉, the value for y remains unchanged because
the first when statement is not run. Then in the second when statement, y is still
public, and thus z also remains public because it depends only on y. Since no
private information is involved in the update to z, all information flow strategies
return the public value False as their final result.
The case where the input x is 〈k ? True : ⊥〉 is more interesting, as illustrated
in Figure 2.1. Note that if the final value appears as True to public observers,
then the private value x has leaked. The strategies differ in the way they handle
the update to y in the first conditional statement. Since this update depends upon
the value of x, we must be careful to avoid the potential implicit flow from x to y.
We now compare how each approach handles this update.
In the Naive column of Figure 2.1, the strategy tracks the influence of x by
applying the label k to y. Regardless, y is false during the second conditional, so
z retains its public True value. Thus, under Naive information flow control, the
result of this code sample is a public copy of x, violating noninterference.
The No-Sensitive-Upgrade approach instead terminates execution on this up-
date, guaranteeing termination-insensitive noninterference, but at the cost of
potentially rejecting valid programs. Stefan et al. implement this strategy in the
elegant LIO library for Haskell [31]. Our work shares the motivations of LIO, but
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extends beyond the No-Sensitive-Upgrade strategy to support faceted values, thus
enabling correct execution of more programs.
The Fenton strategy forbids the update to y, but allows execution to continue.
This approach avoids abnormal termination, but it may return inaccurate results,
as shown in Figure 2.1.
Faceted evaluation solves this dilemma by simulating different executions of
this program, allowing it to provide accurate results and avoid rejecting valid
programs. In the Faceted Evaluation column, we see that the update to y results in
the creation of a new faceted value 〈k ? False : True〉. Any viewer authorized to
see k-sensitive data3 can see the real value of y; unauthorized viewers instead see
True, thus hiding the value of x. In the second conditional assignment, the runtime
updates z in a similar manner and produces the final result 〈 k ? True : False 〉.
In contexts with the k security label, this value will behave as True; in other
contexts, it will behave as False. This code therefore provides noninterference,
avoids abnormal termination, and provides accurate results to authorized users.
2.3 Library Overview
We implement faceted computation in Haskell as a library that enforces in-
formation flow security dynamically, using abstract data types to prevent buggy
or malicious programs from circumventing dynamic protections. In contrast, the
original formulation [2] added faceted values pervasively to the semantics of a
dynamically-typed, imperative λ-calculus. Because of the encapsulation offered
by Haskell’s type system, we do not need to modify the language semantics. Our
library is available at https://github.com/haskell-facets/haskell-faceted.
Our library is conceptually divided into the following components:
3That is, authorized to see data marked as sensitive to principal k.
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type Label = String
data Faceted a
public :: a → Faceted a
faceted :: Label → Faceted a → Faceted a → Faceted a
bottom :: Faceted a
instance Monad Faceted
Figure 2.2: Interface for the pure fragment of the Faceted library.
• Pure faceted values of type a (represented by the type Faceted a).
• Imperative faceted computations (represented by the type FIO a), which can
operate on:
– faceted reference cells (represented by the type FioRef a), and
– facet-enabled file handles / sockets (represented by the type FHandle).
2.3.1 Pure Faceted Values: Faceted a
Figure 2.2 shows the public interface for the pure fragment of our library. This
fragment tracks explicit data flow information in pure computations.
Our implementation presumes that security labels are strings, though leaving
the type of labels abstract is straightforward.
A value of type Faceted a represents multiple values, or facets, of type a. To
maintain security, the facets should not be directly observable; therefore, the data
type is abstract.
The function public injects any type a into the type Faceted a. It accepts
a value v of type a and returns a faceted value that behaves just like v for any
observer.
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The function faceted constructs a value of type Faceted a from a label k and
two other faceted values priv and pub, each of type Faceted a. To any viewer
authorized to see k, the result behaves as priv; to all other observers, the result
behaves as pub (and so on, recursively).
The value bottom (abbreviated ⊥) is a member of Faceted a for any a, and
represents a lack of a value. bottom is used when a default value is necessary, such
as in a public facet. Any computation based on bottom results in bottom.
From faceted, we can define various derived constructors for creating faceted
values with minimal effort. For example:
makePrivate :: Label → a → Faceted a
makePrivate k v = faceted k (public v) bottom
makeFacets :: Label → a → a → Faceted a
makeFacets k priv pub = faceted k (public priv) (public pub)
The Monad instance for Faceted conveniently propagates security labels as
appropriate. For example, the following code uses Haskell’s do syntax to multiply
two values of type Faceted Int.
do x ← makeFacets "k" 7 1 -- <"k" ? 7 : 1>
y ← makeFacets "l" 6 1 -- <"l" ? 6 : 1>
return (x ∗ y) -- <"k" ? <"l" ? 42 : 7> : <"l" ? 6 : 1 »
Here, x is an Int that is extracted from (faceted "k" 7 1), either 7 or 1. The
Faceted monad instance automatically executes the remainder of the do block
twice (once for each possible value of x) before collecting the various results into
a faceted value. The situation is similar for y, so the final faceted value is a tree
with four leaves.
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2.3.2 Faceted Reference Cells: FIO a and FioRef a
For the pure language of Section 2.3.1, information flow analysis is straightfor-
ward because all dependencies between values are explicit; there are no implicit
flows. An implicit flow occurs when a value is computed based on side effects that
depend on private data, as in the following example, where x is an IORef with
initial value 0.
do if secret == 42 -- working in IO monad
then writeIORef x 1
else writeIORef x 2
readIORef x
The return value will be 1 if and only if secret == 42.
Suppose we opt to protect the confidentiality of secret by setting secret =
makePrivate k 42. The type of secret is now Faceted Int. Then our example
can be reformulated:
do n ← secret -- working in Faceted monad
return $ do if n == 42 -- working in IO monad
then writeIORef x 1
else writeIORef x 2
readIORef x
The outer do begins a computation in the Faceted monad, with the value 42
bound to n. This expression has type Faceted (IO Int), so it cannot be “run”
as part of a Haskell program. Thus, the pure fragment of our library described so
far prevents all implicit flows, even those that are safe.
Guided by the types, we seek a way to convert a value of type Faceted (IO a)
to a value of type IO (Faceted a). The latter could then be run to yield a value
of type Faceted a, where the facets account for any implicit flows.
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data Branch = Private Label | Public Label
type PC = [Branch]
data FIO a
instance Monad FIO
runFIO :: FIO a → PC → IO a
prod :: Faceted (FIO (Faceted a)) → FIO (Faceted a)
data FioRef a
newFioRef :: Faceted a → FIO (FioRef (Faceted a))
readFioRef :: FioRef (Faceted a) → FIO (Faceted a)
writeFioRef :: FioRef (Faceted a) → Faceted a → FIO (Faceted ())
Figure 2.3: Interface for FIO and FioRef.
Faceted IO computations take place in the FIO monad (the name is short for
“Faceted I/O”). Figure 2.3 shows the public interface for this fragment of the library.
When faceted data influences control flow, the result of a computation implicitly
depends on the observed facets; the implementation of FIO transparently tracks
this information flow.
The Monad instance for FIO allows sequencing computations in the usual way,
so FIO acts as a (limited) drop-in replacement for IO. If fio1 and fio2 each have
type FIO Int, then the following expression also has type FIO Int.
do x ← fio1
y ← fio2
return (x ∗ y)
The function runFIO converts a value of type FIO a to a value of type IO a.
The side effects in this IO computation will respect the information flow policy.
runFIO takes one additional argument: an initial value for a data structure
called pc (for “program counter label”), which is used for tracking the branching
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of the computation. To guarantee security, it may be necessary to execute parts of
the program multiple times – once for observers who may view k-sensitive data,
and again for observers who may not. During the former branch of computation,
the pc will contain the value Private k; during the latter branch, it will contain
Public k.
The pc argument to runFIO allows controlling the set of observers whose
viewpoints are considered during faceted computation. The empty pc, denoted [],
will force simulation of all possible viewpoints.
A value of type FioRef a (short for “facet-aware IORef”) is a mutable reference
cell where initialization, reading, and writing are all FIO computations that operate
on Faceted values and that account for implicit flows accordingly.
Figure 2.3 presents the public interface to FioRef a, which parallels that of
conventional reference cells of type IORef a.
To write side-effecting code that depends on a faceted value, the Faceted
and FIO monads must be used together. The library function prod enables this
interaction.
Using these library functions, our running example finally looks as follows.
do x ← newFioRef (public 0) -- working in FIO monad
prod $ do v ← secret -- working in Faceted monad
return $ if v == 42
then writeFioRef x (public 1)
else writeFioRef x (public 2)
readFioRef x
As hinted earlier, the inner do block has type Faceted (FIO (Faceted ()))
and so cannot compose with the other actions in the outer do block. To rectify
this, the function prod is enclosing the inner do block, converting it to type FIO
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data FHandle
type View = [Label]
openFileFio :: View → FilePath → IOMode → FIO FHandle
closeFio :: FHandle → FIO ()
getCharFio :: FHandle → FIO (Faceted Char)
putCharFio :: FHandle → Char → FIO ()
Figure 2.4: Interface for FHandle.
(Faceted ()).
In this example, the value read from x will be faceted k 1 0, which correctly
accounts for the influence from secret. In section 2.4, we will explain the machinery
that implements this secure behavior.
2.3.3 Faceted I/O: FHandle
Faceted I/O differs from reference cells in that the network and file system,
which we collectively refer to as the environment, lie outside the purview of our
programming language. The environment has no knowledge of facets and cannot
be retrofitted. Additionally, there are other programs able to read from and write
to the file system. We assume that the environment appropriately restricts other
users of the file handles, and we provide facilities within Haskell to express and
enforce the relevant information flow policy.
Figure 2.4 shows the core of the public interface for facet-aware file handles,
type FHandle.
We support policies that associate with each file handle h a set of labels viewh
of type View. This view indicates the confidentiality for data read from and written
to h. Intuitively, if a view contains a label k, then that view is allowed to see data
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that is confidential to k.
The function openFileFio accepts a view viewh along with a file path and
mode and returns a (computation that returns a) facet-aware handle h protected
by the policy viewh.
When writing to h via putCharFio, the view viewh describes the confidentiality
assured by the external environment for data written to h. In other words, we
trust that the external world will protect the data with those labels in viewh.
When reading from a handle h via getCharFio, we treat viewh as the confi-
dentiality expected by the external world for data read from h. In other words, we
certify that we protect the data received from h. For example, in the following
computation, the character read from h is observable only to views that include
labels "k" and "l".
do h ← openFileFio ["k", "l"] "/tmp/socket.0" ReadMode
getCharFio h
2.4 Formal Semantics
In this section, we formalize the behavior of the Haskell library as an operational
semantics and prove that it guarantees termination-insensitive noninterference.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the formal syntax. The syntactic class t represents
Haskell programs, k is a label, and σ is a “store” mapping addresses a to values,
and mapping file handles h to strings of characters ch.
For ease of understanding, we separate the set of values into three syntactic
classes. FacetedValue contains values in the Faceted monad; FioAction contains
computations in the impure FIO monad; and Value contains both of these, as well
as ordinary values: closures, characters, labels, addresses, and handles.
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ch ∈ Character
k ∈ Label
t ∈ Term ::= x
| λx.t
| t t
| ch Character
| F Faceted values
| faceted k t t
| returnFac t
| bindFac t t
| A FIO actions
| prod t
| () Unit value
F ∈ FacetedValue ::= public t | faceted k F F | bottom
A ∈ FioAction ::= returnFIO t | bindFIO t t | prod F
| newFioRef t | readFioRef t | writeFioRef t t
| getCharFio t | putCharFio t t
Figure 2.5: Source syntax.
a ∈ Address
h ∈ Handle
t ∈ Term ::= . . . | a | h
v ∈ Value ::= F | A | λx.t | ch | a | h | ()
E ∈ EvalContext ::= • t | bindFac • t | faceted k • t | faceted k F •
| prod •
σ ∈ Store = (Address → Term) ∪ (Handle → String)
Figure 2.6: Runtime syntax.
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t ⇓ v Pure evaluation.
v ⇓ v [e-val]
t[x := t1] ⇓ v
(λx.t) t1 ⇓ v [e-app]
t not a value
t ⇓ v1
E[v1] ⇓ v2
E[t] ⇓ v2 [e-ctxt]
returnFac t ⇓ public t [e-ret]
t2 t1 ⇓ F
bindFac (public t1) t2 ⇓ F [e-bind-p]
bindFac F1 t3 ⇓ F ′1
bindFac F2 t3 ⇓ F ′2
F = faceted k F ′1 F ′2
bindFac (faceted k F1 F2) t3 ⇓ F [e-bind-f]
bindFac bottom t ⇓ bottom [e-bind-b]
Figure 2.7: Semantics (part 1).
We define the operational semantics with two big-step evaluation judgments.
• t ⇓ v means that the pure Haskell expression t evaluates to the value v.
• σ,A ⇓FIOpc σ′, v means that the Haskell program “main = runFIO A pc”
changes the store from σ to σ′ and yields the result v.
Figure 2.7 depicts the pure derivation rules. These rules describe a call-by-name
λ-calculus with opaque constants and two library functions: returnFac and bindFac.
These monad operators for Faceted are particularly simple because it is a free
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monad: bindFac F v replaces the public “leaves” of the faceted value F with new
faceted values obtained by calling v.
Figure 2.8 shows the impure derivation rules. The FIO monad operations
(defined by [f-ret] and [f-bind]) are typical of a state monad. The pc annotation
propagates unchanged through these trivial rules.
The next five rules define prod, whose type is:
Faceted (FIO (Faceted a)) -> FIO (Faceted a)
The input, a faceted action, is transformed into an action that returns a faceted
value. This process is straightforward for public and bottom; the public construc-
tor is simply stripped away to reveal the action underneath, while bottom is simply
transformed into a no-op. For faceted, the corresponding rule is [f-prod-f3],
where the process bifurcates into two subcomputations whose results are combined
into a faceted result value. However, there is no need to bifurcate repeatedly for
the same label k, so the bifurcation is remembered by adding k (or k) to the pc an-
notation on each subcomputation. Subsequently, the optimized rules [f-prod-f1]
and [f-prod-f2] will apply. Rather than bifurcating the computation, these rules
will execute only the one path of computation that is relevant to the current pc.
The remainder of Figure 2.8 shows the rules for creation and manipulation of
reference cells, and for input and output.
[f-new] describes the creation of a new faceted reference cell. To preserve
the noninterference property, the cell is initialized with a faceted value that hides
the true value from observers that should not know about the cell. The notation
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〈〈• ? • : •〉〉 means:
〈〈∅ ? t1 : t2〉〉 = t1
〈〈{k} ∪ pc ? t1 : t2〉〉 = faceted k 〈〈pc ? t1 : t2〉〉 t2
〈〈{k} ∪ pc ? t1 : t2〉〉 = faceted k t2 〈〈pc ? t1 : t2〉〉
[f-read] and [f-write] read and write these reference cells. [f-read] is
simple because the values in the store σ will already be appropriately faceted. To
prevent implicit flows, [f-write] must incorporate the pc into the label of the
value stored.
The final rules handle input and output. Each must first confirm that the
file handle h is compatible with the current pc. The notation “pc is visible to L”
means
∀k ∈ pc, k ∈ L and ∀k ∈ pc, k /∈ L,
i.e. L is one of the views being simulated on the current branch of computation.
In [f-get], if pc is visible to L, then the first character ch1 is extracted from
the file. The result is a faceted value that behaves as ch1 for view L, but as
bottom for all other views. If pc is not visible to L, then [f-get-2] applies and
the operation is ignored; the result is simply bottom.
In [f-put], if pc is visible to L, then a character is appended to the end of the
file; otherwise, [f-put-2] applies and the operation is ignored.
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2.4.1 Termination-Insensitive Noninterference
We first define the projection εL(t) of a term t according to a view L ∈ 2Label :
εL(faceted k t1 t2) = εL(t1) if k ∈ L
εL(faceted k t1 t2) = εL(t2) if k /∈ L
εL(•) is homomorphic otherwise.
Similarly, we define the projection εL(σ) of a store σ according to a view L:
εL(σ)(a) = εL(σ(a))
εL(σ)(h) =

σ(h) if L = viewh
 otherwise
where  denotes the empty string. In words, the projected store maps each address
to the projection of the stored value, and the projected store maps each handle
either to the real file contents (if the viewer is viewh) or to .
A state is a pair of a store and a term. We identify states that are equivalent
modulo alpha-renaming of addresses.
Theorem 1 (Termination-Insensitive Noninterference). Assume:
εL(σ1) = εL(σ2) εL(A1) = εL(A2)
σ1, A1 ⇓FIO∅ σ′1, v1 σ2, A2 ⇓FIO∅ σ′2, v2
Then:
εL(σ′1) = εL(σ′2) εL(v1) = εL(v2).
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In other words, if we run two programs that are identical under the L projection,
then the results will be identical under the L projection.
The proof is available in the attached Coq script.
2.5 Application: A Bi-Monadic Interpreter
To demonstrate the expressiveness of the Faceted library, we present a monadic
interpreter for an imperative λ-calculus, whose dynamic information flow security
is guaranteed by the previous noninterference theorem.
The interesting aspect about this interpreter is that it uses two distinct monads.
• The FIO monad captures computations (called Actions in the code), and
is propagated along control flow paths in the traditional style of monadic
interpreters.
• The Faceted monad serves a somewhat different purpose, which is to encap-
sulate the many views of the underlying RawValue. Unlike FIO, this monad
is propagated along data flow paths rather than along control flow paths.
Even though the interpreter’s use of the Faceted monad is non-traditional, faceted
values need exactly this monad interface – particularly considering the necessity of
the monad-specific operation
join :: Faceted (Faceted a)→ Faceted a
which, for the Faceted monad, naturally combines two layers of security labels
into a single layer.
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-- Abstract syntax tree data structure.
data Term =
Var String -- Lambdas
| Lam String Term
| App Term Term
| Const Value -- Constants
-- Runtime data structures.
data RawValue =
CharVal Char -- Characters
| RefVal (FioRef Value) -- Mutable references
| FnVal (Value → Action) -- Functions
type Value = Faceted RawValue
type Action = FIO Value
type Env = String → Value
Figure 2.10: Syntax for the bi-monadic interpreter.
2.5.1 The Interpreted Language
The source language is an imperative call-by-value λ-calculus whose abstract
syntax is defined in Figure 2.10. The language has variables, lambda abstractions,
applications, and primitive constants for manipulating reference cells, performing
I/O, and creating private values.
To ensure that private characters are not printed to the output stream, our
implementation opens the stream using the empty view.
2.5.2 Implementation
Figure 2.11 shows the core of the interpreter, the function eval. As usual, it
takes an environment and a term and returns an action, which has type Action
= FIO (Faceted RawValue). The RawValue type includes characters, mutable
references, and closures.
The most interesting code is the case for an application App t1 t2 (lines 15-19
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1 -- Interpreter.
2 eval :: Env → Term → Action
3 eval e (Var x) = return $ e x
4 eval e (Lam x t) = return $ return $ FnVal $ λv →
5 eval (extend e x v) t
6 eval e (App t1 t2) = do v1 ← eval e t1 -- working in FIO monad
7 v2 ← eval e t2
8 prod $ do
9 FnVal f ← v1 -- working in Faceted monad
10 return $ f v2
11 eval e (Const v) = return v
12
13 -- Constants.
14 private :: RawValue
15 private = FnVal $ λv →
16 return $ faceted "H" v bottom
17 ref :: RawValue
18 ref = FnVal $ λv → do -- working in FIO monad
19 ref ← newFioRef v
20 return $ return $ RefVal ref
21 deref :: RawValue
22 deref = FnVal $ λv → prod $ do -- working in Faceted monad
23 RefVal ref ← v
24 return $ readFioRef ref
25 assign :: RawValue
26 assign = FnVal $ λv1 →
27 return $ return $ FnVal $ λv2 → prod $ do-- working in Faceted monad
28 RefVal ref ← v1
29 rv2 ← v2
30 return $ do -- working in FIO monad
31 writeFioRef ref v2
32 return v2
33 printChar :: RawValue
34 printChar = FnVal $ λv → prod $ do -- working in Faceted monad
35 CharVal c ← v
36 return $ do -- working in FIO monad
37 h ← openFileFio [] "output.txt" AppendMode
38 putCharFio h c
39 closeFio h
40 return v
Figure 2.11: The bi-monadic interpreter eval function.
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let x = ref (private true) in
let y = ref true in
let z = ref true in
let vx = deref x in
if (vx) {
assign y false
}
let vy = deref y in
if (vy) {
assign z false
}
deref z
Figure 2.12: A sample program for the interpreter. For ease of reading, we
assume the availability of standard encodings for let and boolean operations.
in Figure 2.11). As usual, we use a do block (in the FIO monad) to compose the
sub-evaluations of t1 and t2 into faceted values v1 and v2. To extract each
underlying function (FnVal f) from the faceted value v1, we enter a second do
block (this time in the Faceted monad), and then apply f to v2 to yield a result
of type Action = FIO (Faceted RawValue), which the return (on line 19) then
injects into type Faceted (FIO (Faceted RawValue)), completing the Faceted
do block (lines 17-19). Finally, the prod function on line 17 coordinates the two
monads and simplifies the type to FIO (Faceted RawValue), which sequentially
composes with the previous sub-evaluations of t1 and t2.
The remaining language features are provided by the constants below the
interpreter itself: private, ref, deref, assign, and printChar. As for App, these
constants must use prod to perform their services securely.
Figure 2.12 expresses our running example from Figure 1 as a program p in the
interpreted language (with some additional syntactic sugar); running the program
runFIO (eval env p) [] yields the expected result:
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faceted "H" (public true) (public false)
2.6 Related Work
Most information flow mechanisms fall into one of three categories: run-time
monitors that prevent a program execution from misbehaving; static analysis
techniques that analyze the whole program and reject programs that might leak
sensitive information; and finally secure multi-execution, which protects sensitive
information by evaluating the same program multiple times.
Dynamic techniques dominated much of the early literature, such as Fenton’s
memoryless subsystems [11]. However, these approaches tend to deal poorly with
implicit flows, where confidential information might leak via the control flow of
the program; purely dynamic controls either ignore updates to reference cells that
might result in implicit leaks of information [11] or terminate the program on these
updates [35, 1]; both approaches have obvious problems, but these techniques have
seen a resurgence of interest as a possible means of securing JavaScript code, where
static analysis seems to be an awkward fit [10, 15, 13, 18].
Denning’s work [6, 7] instead uses a static analysis; her work was also in-
strumental in bringing information flow analysis into the scope of programming
language research. Her approach has since been codified into different type systems,
such as that of Volpano et al. [32] and the SLam Calculus [14]. Jif [21] uses this
strategy for a Java-like language, and has become one of the more widespread
languages providing information flow guarantees. Sabelfeld and Myers [26] provide
an excellent history of information flow analysis research prior to 2003. Refer to
Russo [25] for a detailed comparison of static and dynamic techniques.
Secure multi-execution [9] executes the same program multiple times represent-
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ing different “views” of the data. For a simple two-element lattice of high and low,
a program is executed twice: one execution can access confidential (high) data but
can only write to authorized channels, while the other replaces all high data with
default values and can write to public channels. This approach has since been
implemented in the Firefox web browser [5] and as a Haskell library [16].
Rafnsson and Sablefeld[23] show an approach to handle declassification and to
guarantee transparency with secure multi-execution.
Zanarini et al. [34] notes some challenges with secure multi-execution; specif-
ically, it alters the behavior of programs violating noninterference (potentially
introducing difficult to analyze bugs), and the multiple processes might produce
outputs to different channels in a different order than expected. They further
address these challenges through a multi-execution monitor. In essence, their
approach executes the original program without modification and compares its
results to the results of the SME processes; if output of secure multi-execution
differs from the original at any point, a warning can be raised to note that the
semantics have been altered.
Faceted evaluation [2] simulates secure multi-execution by the use of special
faceted values, which track different views for data based on the security principals
involved4. While faceted evaluation cannot be parallelized as easily, it avoids
many redundant calculations, thereby improving efficiency [2]. It also allows
declassification, where private data is released to public channels. Austin et al.
[3] exploit this benefit to incorporate policy-agnostic programming techniques,
allowing for the specification of more flexible policies than traditionally permitted
in information flow systems.
Li and Zdancewic [19] implement an information flow system in Haskell, em-
4Faceted values are closely related to the value pairs used by [22]; while intended as a proof
technique rather than a dynamic enforcement mechanism, the construct is essentially identical.
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bedding a language for creating secure modules. Their enforcement mechanism
is dynamic but relies on static enforcement techniques, effectively guaranteeing
the security of the system by type checking the embedded code at runtime. Their
system supports declassification, a critical requirement for specifying many real
world security policies.
Russo et al. [24] provide a monadic library guaranteeing information flow
properties. Their approach includes special declassification combinators, which can
be used to restrict the release of data based on the what/when/who dimensions
proposed by Sabelfeld [28].
Deviese and Piessens [8] illustrate how to enforce information flow in monadic
libraries. A sequence operation e1 » e2 is distinguished from a bind operation e1
»= e2 in that there are no implicit flows with the » operator. They demonstrate
the generality of their approach by applying it to classic static [32], dynamic [27],
and hybrid [12] information flow systems.
Stefan et al. [30] use a labeled IO (LIO) monad to guarantee information flow
analysis. LIO tracks the current label of the execution, which serves as an upper
bound on the labels of all data in lexical scope. IO is permitted only if it would
not result in an implicit flow. It combines this notion with the concept of a current
clearance that limits the maximum privileges allowed for an execution, thereby
eliminating the termination channel. Buiras and Russo[4] show how lazy evaluation
may leak secrets with LIO through the use of the internal timing covert channel.
They propose a defense against this attack by duplicating shared thunks.
Wadler [33] describes the use of monads to structure interpreters for effectful
languages. There has been great effort to improve the modularity of this technique,
including the application of pseudomonads [29] and of monad transformers [20].
Both of these approaches make it possible to design an interpreter’s computation
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monad by composing building blocks that each encapsulate one kind of effect. Our
bi-monadic interpreter achieves a different kind of modularity by using separate
monads for effects and values. The use of a prod function, which links the two
monads together, is originally described by Jones and Duponcheel [17].
2.7 Conclusion
We show how the faceted values technique can be implemented as a library
rather than as a language extension. Our implementation draws on the previous
work to provide a library consisting primarily of two monads, which track both
explicit and implicit information flows. This implementation demonstrates how
faceted values look in a typed context, as well as how they might be implemented
as a library rather than a language feature. It also illustrates some of the subtle
interactions between two monads. Our interpreter shows that this library can serve
as a basis for other faceted value languages or as a template for further Haskell
work.
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Chapter 3
Faceted Secure Multi Execution
Abstract To enforce non-interference, both Secure Multi-Execution (SME) and
Multiple Facets (MF) rely on the introduction of multi-executions. The attrac-
tiveness of these techniques is that they are precise: secure programs running
under SME or MF do not change their behavior. Although MF was intended as an
optimization for SME, it does provide a weaker security guarantee for termination
leaks.
This paper presents Faceted Secure Multi Execution (FSME), a novel synthesis
of MF and SME that combines the stronger security guarantees of SME with the
optimizations of MF. The development of FSME required a unification of the ideas
underlying MF and SME into a new multi-execution framework ( ), which
can be parameterized to provide MF, SME, or our new approach FSME, thus
enabling an apples-to-apples comparison and benchmarking of all three approaches.
Unlike the original work on MF and SME, supports arbitrary (and possibly
infinite) lattices necessary for decentralized labeling models—a feature needed
in order to make possible the writing of applications where each principal can
impose confidentiality and integrity requirements on data. We provide some
micro-benchmarks for evaluating and write a file hosting service, called
51
ProtectedBox, whose functionality can be securely extended via third-party plugins.
3.1 Introduction
Information-flow control (IFC) is a promising technology for systematically
protecting confidentiality and integrity of data. In the last few years, there have
been a proliferation of IFC techniques applied to a wide range of areas such as
hardware [59], operating systems [36], programming languages [11], web browsers
[51] and distributed systems [33]. Many of these techniques guarantee that secrets
are not leaked by enforcing some notion of non-interference [23]. This security
policy can be enforced either statically (e.g. via type-systems), dynamically (e.g.
via runtime monitors), or by a combination of both [45]. Regardless of its dynamic
or static nature, traditional IFC approaches might become conservative, thus
rejecting secure programs due to imprecisions in the analysis of how information
flows.
To mitigate (or even remove entirely) false alarms [57, 43], researchers have
recently proposed IFC techniques based on multi-executions: many copies of a
given program (or parts of it) get executed while carefully adapting their semantics
to avoid information leakage. The price to pay is, however, a degradation in
performance due to repeated computations. Secure Multi-Execution [17] (SME)
and Multiple Facets [4] (MF) are two approaches based on this idea. On one hand,
SME considers programs as black boxes. It executes a copy of the program for
each security level while changing the input and output behavior to avoid leaks.
MF, on the other hand, inspects the code of the program in order to perform
multi-execution of instructions and multiplexing memory only when needed.
Although MF was intended as an optimization for SME, the mechanisms present
different security guarantees for termination leaks [7]—i.e., leaks occurring by
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abnormal termination of programs. More specifically, MF guarantees termination-
insensitive non-interference (TINI), while SME can remove termination leaks under
the right scheduler [28]—thus ensuring termination-sensitive non-interference
(TSNI).
Ngo et al. [41] have recently shown how to combine MF and SME for a simple
while-language in order to ensure TSNI while enjoying some of the MF benefits in
terms of minimizing multi-executions. The idea is very simple: run programs under
a MF semantics until hitting a sensitive computation which seems to “take too
much time to terminate”; in that case the evaluation should restart under a SME
semantics, i.e., by spawning one thread for each security level. While a step in the
right direction, that work takes an all-or-nothing approach: either the program
enjoys the resource-usage-savings of MF or falls into the computations and memory
duplication of SME. Furthermore, their technique requires a priori knowledge
of all the points in the lattice, something which is not feasible for decentralized
lattices—lattices which are commonly used by practical IFC systems to allow
principals to independently express their confidentiality and integrity requirements
on data (e.g., [38, 48, 21, 29, 37, 22, 33, 51]).
From a foundational perspective, this work presents a novel (provably sound)
combination of MF and SME called Faceted Secure Multi Execution (FSME),
which provides a synthesis of both approaches. Our technique starts running
under a MF semantics and spawns only two multi-executions when the current
computation seems to diverge. However, such multi-executions start running under
a MF semantics; so, it might never be necessary to spawn more multi-executions if
computations “do not take much time to finish.” It may seem a small detail, but
it is precisely due to this choice that our approach enjoys the best of both worlds.
The idea of spawning multi-execution on-demand when combining MF and SME is
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also novel. For that, we strongly rely on extending how MF and SME work when
not all the points in the lattice are known—another foundational contribution.
Lastly, our work provides , a unifying framework for multi-execution based
IFC systems. Regardless the desired multi-execution semantics (i.e., MF, SME, or
FSME), behaves exactly the same except for a single specific place.
This work also contributes to the implementation and evaluation of multi-
execution techniques. Despite many claims about MF being more performant
than SME, these approaches have not been evaluated against each other besides
qualitative informal [5] and theoretical results [7]. It is not clear how they compare
quantitatively in terms of performance and memory usage. We believe that one of
the main reasons for this is related to the considerable effort it takes to implement
such multi-execution based systems [14]. In this light, we build upon
abstractions found in the functional programming (FP) language Haskell. Firstly,
the use of a functional language helps to close the gap between our formal calculus
and the implementation—it makes easier to see the correspondence between the
semantics rules and their implementation. Secondly, and similar to other work
[32, 44, 49], the special treatment of side-effects in Haskell makes it possible to
provide as a mere library. In that manner, security developers are relieved
from building special IFC-aware languages from scratch or performing heavy
modifications to the runtime—a major task on its own. Despite IFC libraries
usually being small and elegant, it is possible to build non-trivial secure systems
[22]. We demonstrate the flexibility of our framework by building a prototype file
hosting service, called ProtectedBox, capable of enforcing robust privacy policies
on users’ files even while allowing untrusted apps to deliver extended features to
the system.
It is our intention to establish as a foundation for building multi-execution
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based systems. In summary, the contributions of this work are as follows.
I FSME, a novel combination of MF and SME which lets us enjoy the best of
both worlds.
I An extension of SME to work on an “on-demand basis” together with extension
of MF to work with the infinite lattice induced by decentralized label models like
DC-labels [48].
I , a unifying framework capable of providing MF, SME, and FSME.
I Mechanized soundness proofs of ’s security guarantees in the proof assis-
tant Coq. The proof is parametric on the security lattice as well as the scheduler
responsible to run multi-executions. The proof makes appropriated assumptions
about these parameters—e.g., decidable label equality and fairness of the scheduler.
I An implementation of in Haskell.
I Micro-benchmarks evaluating ’s performance when executing under a
MF, SME, or FSME semantics.
I The implementation of a secure file hosting service called ProtectedBox.
The code, including Coq development and case study, for this paper is available
online1.
3.2 Background
In this work, we assume that programs can access input and output file handles,
which in practice may refer to files in a local or remote filesystem or to network
sockets. Each input and output file has an associated security label l, and these
labels are partially ordered by v and form a security lattice [15]. Concretely,
data read from an input file i with label li should only influence data written to
1https://github.com/MaximilianAlgehed/Multef
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output file o (with label lo) if li v lo; conversely, if li 6v lo then such influences or
information flows are not permitted and should be prevented by the enforcement
mechanism. To simplify our discussion, we initially assume a security lattice with
two labels low (L) and high (H), where H 6v L is the only disallowed flow.
We begin with a review of prior technology for ensuring dynamic information
flow control via multi-execution. One prominent technology is SME [17], which we
illustrate via the Haskell code below. The when instruction is simply an if-then-else
where the else branch is just empty.
do input <- get highFile
when heavyExpr (put lowFile (input+1))
SME will execute this program twice. One execution is for the high security label
H, which can read from highFile (get highFile), but is prohibited from writing to
lowFile, i.e., put lowFile (input+1) is ignored. The second execution is for the low
label L and cannot read from highFile; instead some dummy value (e.g., 0) gets
bound to variable input, and subsequently input+1 (e.g., 1) is written to lowFile.
By running the two executions concurrently, SME provides termination-sensitive
non-inteference (TSNI). Moreover, SME is precise, i.e., it does not change the
behavior of non-interfering programs (modulo some technicalities about the relative
ordering of writes [57, 43]).
One of the main limitations of SME is performance. For the 2-point lattice,
the boolean expression heavyExpr gets evaluated twice, even if it does not depend
on the input. More generally, a system with n principals might have a powerset
security lattice with 2n labels, and so require 2n executions.
To address these performance concerns, MF semantics, or also called multi-
faceted execution, tries to avoid repeated redundant executions by running the
evaluation of heavyExpr in the code above just once. More concretely, variable input
is bound to the faceted value 〈H ? 42 : 0〉, which denotes that the high (secret) value
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of input is 42 while its corresponding low (public/dummy) value is 0. As a result,
the evaluation of heavyExpr is triggered only once, not twice—after all, it does not
depend on secrets. The evaluation of input+1 yields the faceted value 〈H ? 43 : 1〉,
and put then writes the public facet, i.e., 1, to the low file, thus avoiding the
information leak.
MF provides both precision and non-interference guarantees. Unfortunately,
since MF “intertwines” the low and high executions, a low output could block
indefinitely on a divergent high computation, and so MF provides only termination-
insensitive non-interference (TINI)—rather than the stronger and more desirable
TSNI guarantee of SME.
To illustrate this limitation, consider the program below.
do secret <- get highFile
when (secret == 42) diverge
put lowFile 0
Here, secret is bound to 〈H ? 42 : 0〉, indicating that the value 42 read from highFile
is considered private, with a corresponding public dummy value of 0. Consequently,
the subsequent when instruction executes both the then branch (with side-effects
and I/O effects visible to high observers) and the (empty) else branch (if it were
not empty, like in a regular if-then-else, the side-effect and I/O actions would
be visible to the low observers); after both branches terminate, the remainder of
the program executes (with effects visible to both high and low observers). One
consequence of this faceted semantics is that the termination effect of the high
branch is now visible to low observers, which is why MF guarantees only TINI
rather than TSNI.
In summary, both MF and SME are precise (i.e., they do not change the
behavior of secure programs). On one hand, SME provides TSNI, but with some
(perhaps significant) overhead. In contrast, MF addresses this overhead, but at
57
the cost of a weaker security guarantee (TINI).
This work presents a new runtime monitor called FSME (Faceted Secure Multi
Execution) that combines the advantages of MF and SME. Note that our approach
improves over [41] in that it does not require to restart computations—instead, it
gracefully transitions from MF into SME as needed by mid-computations, which in
turn requires compatible representations of state and control in the two semantics.
Developing the appropriate semantic machinery to unify MF and SME into FSME
and to gracefully transition between them is a key contribution of this work.
3.3 A Unifying Multi Execution Framework
We formalize our ideas in terms of a unifying operational semantic framework,
called , that can express all of SME, MF, and FSME. Our formal development
targets an imperative language with mutable reference cells and reactive I/O.
However, for ease of exposition, we present here only the core calculus with facets
and mutable references; semantics for I/O is deferred to Appendix 3.A. Following
Haskell, we distinguish between pure and side-effecting computations.
3.3.1 Functional core
The functional core of is standard, including variables, functions, function
application, integers, addition, and conditionals. The language is typed. For
simplicity, the core types include just Int and function types T → T . We say t :: T
to mean that t has type T .
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3.3.2 Faceted values
The language includes faceted values V :: Fac T , whose behavior can differ
according to the security label of an observer. The constructor raw is used to
encode concrete values within faceted ones, e.g., raw 42 should be thought of as
simply 42. For instance, the faceted value 〈H ? 42 : 0〉 from Section 3.2 gets encoded
as 〈H ? raw 42 : raw 0〉 in our semantics. For another example, (raw 0) :: Fac Int
should be thought of as a faceted value that behaves like 0 for all observers. In
contrast,
〈Alice ? raw 42 : raw 0〉 :: Fac Int
is another value of type Fac Int that behaves like 42 for Alice (a label in the security
lattice), but like 0 for observers who cannot see Alice’s private data. Faceted
values can be nested in a tree-like structure, so
〈Alice ? 〈Bob ? raw 42 : raw 1〉 : raw 0〉
behaves like 42 only for viewers who can see the secrets of both Alice and Bob.
To ensure security, programs are not allowed to directly manipulate the raw
leaves of a faceted value. Instead, we provide a primitive called bind responsible to
apply a computation to each of the leaves of the tree structure denoted by faceted
values. For example, to add 1 to the faceted value shown above, we would write
bind 〈Alice ? 〈Bob ? raw 42 : raw 1〉 : raw 0〉 (λx. raw (x+ 1))
which evaluates (in several steps) to
〈Alice ? 〈Bob ? raw 43 : raw 2〉 : raw 1〉.
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Observe that the computation (λx. raw (x + 1)) is applied to each leave of the
faceted value to yield the result. Operationally, if V :: Fac T1 and f :: T1 → Fac T2,
then bind V f
I extracts each raw leaf of type T1 from the faceted tree V ,
I applies f to this T1 argument, producing a result of type Fac T2, and
I joins these various results from f into a single faceted value of type Fac T2,
which is returned from bind.
3.3.3 FIO computations
So far, we can express side-effect-free computations on faceted values. To
express programs that manipulate both faceted values and mutable reference
cells, we introduce the FIO monad—a monad (e.g., [56]) is just a special-purposed
data type designed to express computations with side-effects in pure functional
languages like Haskell. In this light, the type FIO T characterizes side-effectful
secure computations that yield a T value. Because of being a monad, computations
of type FIO T are built by two fundamental operations:
return :: T → FIO T
(>>= ) :: FIO T1 → (T1 → FIO T2)→ FIO T2
The operation return x produces a computation that returns the value of x without
causing side-effects. The function (>>= )—called FIO-bind to distinguish it from
the analogous bind operation on faceted values—is used to sequence FIO computa-
tions and their associated side-effects. Specifically, fio>>= f executes fio, takes its
result and passes it to the function f , which then returns a second computation to
run. Some languages, like Haskell, provide syntactic sugar for monadic computa-
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tions known as do-notation. For instance, the program fio>>=λx.return (x+ 1),
which adds 1 to the value produced by computation fio, can be written as
do x← fio
return (x+ 1)
which gives a more “imperative” feeling to programs.
3.3.4 Building side-effectful computations based on faceted
values
In most programs, side-effects may occur conditionally based on values in
the program. For example, the following code snippet performs two different
side-effects depending on whether x :: Int is positive. Let us imagine that, for
instance, code effect0 :: FIO () writes 0 to a reference, while effect1 :: FIO () writes
1 instead:
if (x > 0) effect0 effect1 :: FIO ()
If computations have side-effects which must depend on faceted values, then their
type will be of the form Fac (FIO T ) for some type T , i.e., a faceted value whose
tree-like structure stores side-effectful computations at its leaves—thus expressing
that different FIO T computations should be visible to different security levels. In
this case, we rely on the special operator
run :: Fac (FIO T )→ FIO (Fac T )
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to enable interaction2 between Fac and FIO. Intuitively, run takes all the side-
effectful actions inside the tree-like structure of the argument and somehow (e.g.,
by sequentialising) executes them and collects the results in another tree-like
faceted value. For instance, if we change the previous snippet so that the writes
should depend on fx :: Fac Int, then it becomes
p = bind fx (λx. raw (if (x > 0)
effect0
effect1 )) :: Fac (FIO ())
The function (λx. . . .) :: Int → Fac (FIO ()) is run for each integer in fx, and so
(bind fx (λx. . . .) :: Fac (FIO ()) results in a faceted tree of FIO computations—we
use ellipses here to denote the corresponding code above. The primitive run in
run (p) :: FIO (Fac ())
then controls the sequential or concurrent execution of these various FIO com-
putations, and thus encapsulates the key design choices regarding the different
multi-execution approaches that we consider. In our framework, the semantics
of this operation is the one that determines if we consider MF, SME, or FSME
when launching multi-executions. We proceed now to add the operations related
to building and executing side-effectful computations.
3.3.5 Supported multi-executions approaches
Before we dive into the technicalities of our semantics, we provide some examples
to illustrate the different multi-executions semantics that considers. Let us
2This run operator enables interaction between the two monads FIO and Fac in the manner
proposed by Jones and Duponcheel [25] as the swap construction.
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consider the following code fragment:
p = do fx ← get highFile
run (bind fx (λx. raw (put highFile (x+ 1))))
run (bind fx (λx. raw (divergeIf42 x)))
put lowFile 0
This program p :: FIO () works as follows. It reads a secret value from a sensitive
file—let us assume that the file has stored the number 42. Hence, primitive get
returns the faceted integer fx = 〈H ? raw 42 : raw 0〉, thus protecting the secret 42.
In the next line, run and bind are used to extract the raw x :: Int from the secret,
increment it, and write it into a high file. Similarly, the next line calls the function
divergeIf42 which loops when the value given as an argument is 42. Finally, the
last instruction writes 0 to a public file. We use this example to illustrate some of
the challenges in ensuring TSNI.
SME The original formulation of SME [17] would run two versions of the program,
as shown in Figure 3.1a. The left high execution can read and write high files, but
cannot write to low files. Conversely, the right low execution never sees any secret
data; it reads dummy values from high files, but it can write to low files. As the
figure shows, SME duplicates both memory and code. The divergence of the high
execution does not block the public write in the low execution, thus satisfying
TSNI.
Demand-driven SME Our demand-driven optimization of SME is shown in
Figure 3.1b, where the high and low executions are not forked until the first call to
run, which then forks two copies of the entire continuation, again satisfying TSNI.
As with the main thread, every forked multi-execution will not spawn others until
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reaching another run.
MF Figure 3.1c illustrates how MF processes the example, where run forks two
(high and low) subcomputations, and then waits for them to terminate before
executing the continuation. This approach is potentially more efficient, but at
the cost of violating TSNI, since the divergent high computation now blocks the
subsequent public write.
FMSE Finally, Figure 3.1d illustrates our novel combination of MF and SME
to obtain the best of both worlds, i.e., TSNI security and MF efficiency. Here, run
forks two subcomputations, and if both subcomputations terminate within a given
time bound (as in the first call to run), then the continuation is run just once,
as in MF. However, if the time bound is exceeded (as in the second call of run),
then the continuation is executed twice, thus satisfying TSNI. The newly spawned
computations will not fork others until reaching run and the time bound has been
exceeded again—this is a novelty with respect to previous combination of MF and
SME [41] and it proves crucial to get good performance in our implementation (see
Sections 3.9 and 3.10). Furthermore, when it comes to non-termination, FSME
guarantees that the thread which hits divergence under a branch does not stop
others from making progress. Fully stopping progress in programs can only occur
when looping under an empty pc—which is secure since it denotes divergence based
on public information.
Note that the TSNI guarantee holds for any finite timeout. Larger timeouts may
lead to fewer forked continuations and so better performance. Various policies can
be used to set the timeout. One plausible option is to set the timeout for the private
subcomputation at (say) twice the time required for the public subcomputation.
supports all these variations in multi-execution semantics just by changing
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the semantics of run, as we explain below.
3.3.6 Formal semantics
To illustrate the possible semantics for run, we formalize a evaluation
relation t −→pc t′ that captures MF and SME, as well as other forking strategies
like FSME. Here, pc is the program counter label, which is a set of constraints
called branches, each of the form k or k. If k ∈ pc, then the computation can see
only the high-confidentiality facet VH of any faceted value 〈k ?VH :VL〉. Conversely,
if k ∈ pc, the computation should only see VL. If neither k nor k are in pc, then
the computation processes both facets VH and VL.
Conceptually, pc describes which security labels l ∈ Lattice are represented by
the current computation. We formalize this intuition by the following function
views, which maps a pc to the corresponding set of labels:
views(pc) = {l ∈ Lattice | (∀k ∈ pc. k v l) ∧ (∀k ∈ pc. k 6v l)}
For example, views({k1, k2, k3, k4}) only includes lattice elements in the upward
closure of k1 and k2 and not in the upward closure of k3 or k4. The most interesting
rules for t −→pc t′ are summarized in Figure 3.2—see Appendix 3.A for the rest of
the semantic rules.
Forking on-demand The rules for run V form the core of our evaluation strategy,
and depend on the structure of the faceted computation tree V :: Fac (FIO T ). If V
is a faceted value 〈k ? t1 : t2〉, then in general rule [f-run-facet-3] creates two new
threads, denoted by the syntax [〈〈k ? run t1 : run t2〉〉] , which will proceed to evaluate
t1 and t2, respectively. Subsequently, the rule [f-thread-1] permits evaluation
of t1, with k added to the pc, indicating that side-effects of the computation t1
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should only be visible at security levels in views(pc ∪ {k}). Conversely, the rule
[f-thread-2] permits evaluation of t2, with k added to pc. Both rules may be
applicable at the same time (our semantics is nondeterministic), which allows for
t1 and t2 to be evaluated in any order. A concrete scheduler can choose to use
either [f-thread-1] or [f-thread-2] first, and may interleave them to achieve
concurrency.
Observe that adding a new branch constraint to the pc may entail views(pc)
is empty, which means that the current computation is not visible to any ob-
server. Rules [f-run-facet-1] and [f-run-facet-2] are optimizations to avoid
unnecessary creation of such “invisible” threads.
MF semantics Once each FIO computation run ti for i ∈ {1, 2} terminates
to return Vi, rule [f-merge] joins the two threads back together into a single
terminated FIO computation return 〈k ?V1 :V2〉. The rules described so far perform
MF-like computation by blocking the continuation of run until both sub-threads
terminate.
SME semantics Alternatively, to permit SME-like computation, rule
[f-fork-continuation] allows the continuation (the enclosing evaluation context
E) to be copied into each sub-thread, yielding [〈〈k ?E[t1] :E[t2]〉〉] . Consequently,
the evaluation of the continuation E in the low thread E[t2] is not blocked by
a divergent high computation t1 in the high thread. This enables a stronger
termination-sensitive security guarantee, but at the cost of evaluating E twice.
FSME semantics Since supports both MF and SME, it is now possible
to express our novel approach, Faceted Secure Multi Execution (FSME), which
combines the benefits of both. Under most circumstances, FSME proceeds exactly
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like MF. However, if say the low subcomputation t2 returns but t1 exceeds a policy-
specified timeout, then the rule [f-fork-continuation] is applied to fork the
enclosing continuation E, thus allowing the low view to proceed without blocking
on the high view.
Note that our semantics is non-deterministic, enabling different evaluation
strategies to provide MF, SME, and FSME-like behavior. Although we consider
a call-by-name semantics, we expect our results to extend to strict languages
by the introduction of explicit suspensions—a well-known technique to encode
call-by-name operations in call-by-value semantics.
Side Effects We extend the operational semantics to support both mutable
reference cells and I/O by extending the evaluation relation from terms t −→pc t′
to states σ −→pc σ′, where each state has the form (t,M, P, I, O). The memory
M maps reference addresses a to faceted values. Note that reference cells always
contain faceted data, as they may be updated by computations that should only
be visible at certain security levels. The output buffer O contains an integer
sequence O(o) for each output channel o, which is extended by put o n. The input
buffer I also contains an integer sequence I(i) for each input channel i, but these
input buffers are not modified during execution; instead, we maintain a buffer
pointer P (i) (pointing into I(i)) that is incremented as necessary during each get i
operation. Since computations at different security levels may advance at different
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rates, the buffer pointer P (i) can be a faceted tree with integer leaves.
M ∈ Memory = Address → FacetedValue
p ∈ BufferPointer ::= n | 〈k ? p : p〉
P ∈ BufferPointers = InputHandle → BufferPointer
I ∈ InputBuffer = InputHandle → Z∗
O ∈ OutputBuffer = OutputHandle → Z∗
σ ∈ State ::= (t,M, P, I, O)
The previously described rules extend in a natural manner from terms to states.
Figure 3.3 shows the rules to allocate, read, and write reference cells, making sure
that values written to the memory M appropriately reflect the current program
counter label pc, using the following notation to construct a faceted value from a
pc:
〈〈• ? • : •〉〉 : PC → FacetedValue → FacetedValue
→ FacetedValue
〈〈{} ?V1 :V2〉〉 = V1
〈〈pc ∪ {k} ?V1 :V2〉〉 = 〈k ? 〈〈pc ?V1 :V2〉〉 :V2〉
〈〈pc ∪ {k} ?V1 :V2〉〉 = 〈k ?V2 : 〈〈pc ?V1 :V2〉〉〉
Appendix 3.A contains a full definition of our operational semantics, including
various rules (such as for I/O) that we do not have space to include here.
3.4 Termination Insensitive Security Guarantees
As a starting point for reasoning about the correctness properties of our faceted
framework, we first develop a corresponding “standard” semantics std−→ for
that does not perform any faceted evaluation. This semantics works over non-
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faceted states σ that do not include faceted values 〈k ?V :V 〉, faceted input buffer
pointers 〈k ? p : p〉, or concurrent faceted threads [〈〈k ? t : t〉〉] . Many of the rules are
identical to the corresponding −→pc rules; Figure 3.4 illustrates some modified
rules that avoid introducing facets for reference cells.
For any faceted state σ and label l, we can generate a corresponding non-
faceted state, denoted σ↓l, that is the view of σ seen by an observer at level l. This
projection operation σ↓l is defined in Figure 3.5. We say σ and σ′ are l-equivalent
(written σ ≈l σ′) if their l-projections are identical (i.e., σ↓l = σ′↓l).
We now show that each faceted framework step σ −→pc σ′ corresponds to either
zero or one standard evaluation steps of σ↓l, provided that l ∈ views(pc). For
example, σ −→pc σ′ could evaluate a high thread t1 inside σ = ([〈〈H ? t1 : t2〉〉] , . . .),
resulting in σ↓H std−→ σ′↓H and σ↓L = σ′↓L. Moreover, if σ −→pc is stuck, then the
projected state σ↓l std−→ is also stuck, again provided that l ∈ views(pc). Finally,
a faceted step σ −→pc σ′ does not change any of the state components M,P, I, O
seen by a viewer at any level l /∈ views(pc).
Theorem 1 (Projection).
1. If σ −→pc σ′ and l ∈ views(pc), then either σ ≈l σ′ or σ↓l std−→ σ′↓l.
2. If σ 6−→pc and l ∈ views(pc), then σ↓l 6 std−→ .
3. If (t,M, P, I, O) −→pc (t′,M ′, P ′, I ′, O′) and l /∈ views(pc), then M ≈l M ′
and P ≈l P ′ and I ≈l I ′ and O ≈l O′.
Based on this projection theorem, we show that our framework satisfies
termination-insensitive non-interference. Essentially, if σ1 and σ2 are l-equivalent
states, then running both states to termination will produce l-equivalent final
states, that is, evaluation does not leak information that should be kept hidden
from l. Here we use σ′i 6−→∅ to denote that state σ′i cannot be evaluated further,
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t↓l = t 〈k ?F1 :F2〉↓l =
F1↓l k v lF2↓l otherwise
[〈〈k ? t1 : t2〉〉]↓l =
t1↓l k v lt2↓l otherwise
(put o t)↓l =
put o (t↓l) lo = lreturn (t↓l) otherwise
t↓l is homomorphic otherwise
M↓l = M M↓l = λa.M(a)↓l
p↓l = p n↓l = n
〈k ? p1 : p2〉↓l =
p1↓l k v lp2↓l otherwise
P↓l = P P↓l = λi.P (i)↓l
I↓l = I I↓l = λi.
I(i) l i v l otherwise
O↓l = O O↓l = λo.
O(o) lo = l otherwise
σ↓l = σ (t,M, P, I, O)↓l = (t↓l,M↓l, P↓l, I↓l, O↓l)
Figure 3.5: Projection functions.
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and run both computations with the empty pc = ∅, so the faceted framework
simulates standard evaluation for all views.
Theorem 2 (Termination-Insensitive Non-Interference).
If σ1 ≈l σ2 and σ1 −→∗∅ σ′1 6 −→∅ and σ2 −→∗∅ σ′2 6 −→∅ then
σ′1 ≈l σ′2.
3.5 Fair Scheduling
The semantics σ −→pc σ′ is non-deterministic, and so requires a fair scheduler
in order to guarantee the desired termination-sensitive security properties. To
illustrate this requirement, consider the term t:
[〈〈k ? diverge : return (raw 2)〉〉] >>=λ_.t2
where t2 = put publicFile 3 and diverge is a computation that diverges based on the
value of some secret. A scheduler that prioritized evaluation of the divergent high
thread diverge via [f-thread-1] could forever block the low output on publicFile—
which produces a termination leak since the attacker would never see the output 3
performed by t2. Alternatively, the semantics does permit the low thread to make
progress, by using [f-fork-continuation] to lift the continuation (λ_.t2) inside
each forked thread, and subsequently executing the continuation twice, at both
security levels (in a manner reminiscent of SME) and finally executing the low
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write t2 without blocking on diverge.
t = [〈〈k ? diverge : return (raw 2)〉〉] >>=λ_.t2
−→∅ [〈〈k ? diverge>>= (λ_.t2) : return (raw 2)>>=λ_.t2〉〉]
−→∅ [〈〈k ? diverge>>= (λ_.t2) : (λ_.t2) (raw 2)〉〉]
−→∅ [〈〈k ? diverge>>= (λ_.t2) : t2〉〉]
We introduce a fairness requirement to ensure that the implementation does
not indefinitely choose high executions when low executions are available—thus
avoiding possible termination leaks. A fair state Σ = (σ, s) consists of a state σ
plus additional scheduling information s.
Σ ∈ FairState ::= (σ, s)
s ∈ SchedulingInfo
We leave the scheduling information s abstract and assume only a fair evaluation
relation
(σ, s) fair−→ (σ′, s′)
satisfying the properties
• Validity: If (σ, s) fair−→ (σ′, s′) then σ −→∅ σ′.
• Blocking: If (σ, s) 6 fair−→ then σ 6−→∅ .
• Fairness: ∀σ, s, l.∃n ∈ N. if σ can l-step, then any n-step fair evaluation
sequence (σ, s) fair−→n (σ′, s′) includes an l-step.
The fairness condition says that, given a fair state (σ, s) and a label l, if the
projected state σ↓l seen by a viewer at level l can make progress, then there exists
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some step limit n ∈ N such that any n-step fair evaluation (σ, s) fair−→n (σ′, s′) will
include progress seen by a viewer at level l. This is the essential requirement that
stops low outputs from being blocked indefinitely on high computations. The fair
evaluation relation will typically be deterministic.
3.6 Termination Sensitive Security Guarantees
We next prove a stronger termination-sensitive non-interference result, based
on the fair scheduling semantics. First, given any fair state (σ, s) where the l-
projection σ↓l can perform a standard step, then the fair semantics will eventually
perform a corresponding step. That is, no view l is ever blocked indefinitely by
the fair semantics.
Theorem 3 (Fair Projection).
If σ↓l std−→ σ1 then ∃σ2, s2. (σ, s) fair−→∗ (σ2, s2) and σ2↓l = σ1.
The fair semantics satisfies TSNI: given two l-equivalent states σ1 ≈l σ2, if σ1
evaluates to σ′1 via the fair semantics, then σ2 must also evaluate to a corresponding
l-equivalent state σ′2 (and in particular σ2 cannot diverge before doing so).
Theorem 4 (Termination-Sensitive Non-Interference).
If σ1 ≈l σ2 and (σ1, s1) fair−→∗ (σ′1, s′1) then
∃σ′2, s′2. (σ2, s2) fair−→∗ (σ′2, s′2) and σ′1 ≈l σ′2.
Recently, Ngo, Piessens, and Rezk [39] call indirect termination sensitive non-
interference (ITSNI) to security conditions (like ours) where the termination
behavior of sensitive programs is not exposed via public inputs and outputs despite
their divergence. In this work, however, we refer to our security condition as TSNI
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since it is a more widely accepted term.3
The fair semantics is also transparent, in that it does not perturb the behavior
of non-interfering programs. We consider a program to be any term t without
facets (i.e., without any secrets). We say a program t is non-interfering if running
t with two l-equivalent inputs I1 ≈l I2 gives l-equivalent behavior, i.e. if
(t, ∅, λi.0, I1, λo.) std−→∗ σ1
then there is some σ2 ≈l σ1 such that
(t, ∅, λi.0, I2, λo.) std−→∗ σ2
Here, (t, ∅, λi.0, I1, λo.) is the initial state for running t with the empty memory,
0-initialized buffer pointers, input I1, and empty output buffers.
For such programs that are non-interfering under the standard semantics, the
fair faceted semantics does not change behavior.
Theorem 5 (Transparency).
Consider any standard run σ = (t, ∅, λi.0, I, λo.) std−→∗ σ′ of a non-interfering
program t. For all l ∈ Lattice, the fair semantics generates a corresponding run
(σ, s) fair−→∗ (σ′′, s′′)
with σ′ ≈l σ′′. In particular, all l-visible output buffers in σ′ and σ′′ are identical.
3More precisely, our security condition is progress-sensitive non-interference[35]: it ensures
that information is not leaked via termination even in the presence of outputs.
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3.7 Decentralized Labels
In our framework, the semantic rule for run determines when multi-executions
are necessary. To recap briefly, this rule has the following side conditions (recall
Figure 3.2) for a given pc and label k.
views(pc ∪ {k}) = ∅
views(pc ∪ {k}) = ∅
Recall that the definition of views(pc) hinges on quantifying over all labels in
the lattice. The definition of views(pc) in Section 3.3 is:
views(pc) = {l ∈ Lattice | (∀k ∈ pc. k v l) ∧ (∀k ∈ pc. k 6v l)}
Where l ranges over labels in the lattice. The reader may be worried that this
definition means that our calculus is not applicable to infinite, decentralised,
lattices, a severe restriction to real-world applicability would it be the case. In
this section, we show that the condition views(pc) = ∅ is decidable given that the
lattice has a decidable ordering relation (v) and computable join (unionsq)—a novelty
with respect to previous work (e.g., [41, 4]) that assume either finite lattices or
lattices with just a confidentiality component.
We introduce the notion of a candidate label for a given pc, defined as
lc(pc) =
⊔{k | k ∈ pc}
which is the smallest label that must be in views(pc). To check if views(pc) is
non-empty, we simply check that for any negated label k ∈ pc, k does not flow
into this candidate label.
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Theorem 6 (Emptiness Check).
∀pc. views(pc) 6= ∅ ⇔ ∀k ∈ pc. k 6v lc(pc)
This theorem gives us a decision procedure for finite PCs when the lattice has
decidable (v) and computable (unionsq): it guarantees that we are not limited in our
choice of lattice when instantiating . One consequence of this result is that
can use practical decentralised label models like DC-labels [50] and DLM
[34].
3.7.1 Disjunction Category Labels
Disjunction Category (DC) Labels is a decentralized labeling scheme whereby
labels are represented as pairs of finite monotonic propositional logical formulas,
i.e., logical formulas without negation or implication. The atoms in the formulae
represent actors in the system. Each label consists of two such formulas, one
expressing a confidentiality and the other an integrity requirement.
A DC label, then, is a tuple 〈C, I〉, where C stands for confidentiality and I
for integrity. When it comes to confidentiality, conjunctions represent the multiple
interest of principals to protect the data, while disjunctions denote groups wherein
any member may learn the information. For instance, the formula Alice ∧ Bob
indicates that information is sensitive to both principals and requires their joint
consensus to observe it. In contrast, Alice∨Bob reflects that data can be observed
either by one of the principals. Dually, when it comes to integrity, conjunctions
of principals represent groups of principals where members are independently
responsible for the information. As a example, the formula Alice ∧ Bob means
that Alice is completely responsible for the data, and so is Bob. Conversely,
disjunctions of principals represent groups that collectively take responsibility for
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the information, i.e., no single principal takes full responsibility. For example, the
formula Alice ∨ Bob means that Alice and Bob collectively are responsible for
the data—both may have contributed to or influenced it. This notion of labels is
general enough to encode the label models used in many IFC operating systems
(e.g., Asbestos [21], HiStar[58], and Flume [29]) as well as a subset of DLM [34].
DC Labels form a lattice where the definition of the ordering (can-flow-to)
relation v is as follows.
C1 ` C0 I0 ` I1
〈C0, I0〉 v 〈C1, I1〉
The sequent A ` B should be read "given the assumption A, we can prove B
using the rules of propositional logic." As an example, let us consider the DC label
L1 = 〈Bob,Bob ∨ Alice〉, where data is confidential to Bob but he does not assume
full responsibility for it, and label L2 = 〈Bob∧Alice,Bob〉 where data is confidential
to both principals but Bob assumes responsibility for it. Can data label with L1
flow into entities label with L2, i.e., L1 v L2? When it comes to confidentiality, it
holds that Alice ∧ Bob ` Bob. However, Alice ∨ Bob 0 Bob; otherwise Bob would
assume full responsibility for information that he has not completely vouched for,
wherefore L1 6v L2. Note that for any pair of labels ` and `′ the statement ` v `′
is decidable using standard techniques like SAT solvers or BDDs [20, 1].
The join (unionsq) of two labels is also easily constructed by taking the conjunction
of the confidentiality components and the disjuction of the integrity components.
〈C0, I0〉 unionsq 〈C1, I1〉 = 〈C0 ∧ C1, I0 ∨ I1〉
With computable join (unionsq) and decidable ordering (v) we obtain a full decision
procedure for emptyness of view of finite PCs under DC-labels, thus can
naturally support expressive DC-labels.
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3.8 Implementation
In this section, we give an overview of the implementation of . Particularly,
we describe some technical problems to overcome in order to deliver as a
Haskell library. Our implementation supports references and I/O, and is easily
extended with any effects that can be accommodated by our formal results.
can be used as a basis to implement IFC-secure plugins and applications.
3.8.1 Basic structures
We begin by representing labels and program counters as data types in Haskell.
data Label -- Kept abstract for this presentation
data Branch = Private Label | Public Label
type PC = [Branch]
We use the syntax [a] for denoting the type of lists of elements of type a and
x:xs to denote the insertion x at the head of the list xs. The decision procedure
described in Section 3.7.1 for deciding if a view is empty is named but kept abstract
in the interest of brevity.
isEmptyViews :: PC -> Bool
Faceted values are implemented as the following data type [26].
data Fac a where
Raw :: a -> Fac a
Bind :: Fac a -> (a -> Fac b) -> Fac b
Q :: Label -> Fac a -> Fac a -> Fac a
The constructors Raw, Bind, and Q (for question mark) correspond to the construc-
tors raw, bind, and 〈• ? • : •〉 in our calculus, respectively. With faceted values in
place, we proceed to provide the FIO operations in our calculus.
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data FIO a where
Return :: a -> FIO a
(:>>=:) :: FIO a -> (a -> FIO b) -> FIO b
Run :: Fac (FIO a) -> FIO (Fac a)
-- Primitives for references and I/O
...
Similarly to Fac, the constructors of FIO denote different operations used to build
terms of type FIO—a standard approach taken when representing domain-specific
languages (DSLs) in Haskell [52]. For brevity, we focus only on constructors
representing return, :>>=:, and run, and we refer the interested reader to Appendix
3.B for further details.
3.8.2 Executor commonalities
Our goal is to implement three executors for programs of type FIO a so that,
by changing the executor, we can execute programs under MF, MF-par, SME,
or FSME. Ideally, we want our executors to have the same type and to “factor
out” their common behavior as much as possible. With this in mind, we propose
the following type for the executors: FIO a -> PC -> IO (a, PC), i.e., it takes a
FIO-program and an initial pc (PC), and returns a (possibly) side-effectful program
which produces a result of type a and a final pc (IO (a,PC)). In Haskell, the special
data type IO r denotes programs that might perform side-effects (e.g., writing to a
file) and return values of type r.
We start by defining the executor execute as a base implementation of all the
commonalities across the multi-executions techniques.
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execute :: FIO a -> PC -> IO (a, PC)
-- Def. monadic FIO primitives
execute (Return a) = return (a, pc)
execute (fio :>>=: rest) = do
(a, pc) <- execute fio pc
execute (rest a) pc
-- Def. for references and I/O
...
The code skeleton above shows how to execute the monadic FIO -primitives in
a manner that is common to all the multi-execution techniques—we omit those
for references and I/O for brevity and simplicity. More precisely, Return simply
maps to the return in IO (i.e., return (a,pc)). The bind operator (:>>=:) is defined
as expected: it reduces the given fio computation and passes its result of type
a to rest and executes the resulting FIO computation (i.e., execute (rest a) pc).
According to Figure 3.2, the behavior of many FIO -operations are common to
all the multi-executions techniques supported by our calculus. It is easy to show
that the cases in the definition of execute corresponds to the semantic rules in
Appendix 3.A, Figure 3.13. For instance, execute (Return t :>>=: rest) is equiva-
lent to execute (rest t)—thus matching the rule [f-bind-fio] in Figure 3.10. The
interesting part of implementing execute arises from evaluating Run, the constructor
responsible of introducing multi-executions. For Run, it is not possible (as expected)
to have a common code for all the different multi-execution techniques.
3.8.3 MF executor
We show here the behavior of Run in the MF executor.
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execute (Run (Q k priv publ)) pc
| isEmptyViews (Public k : pc) -> execute (Run priv) pc
| isEmptyViews (Private k : pc) -> execute (Run publ) pc
| otherwise -> do
(priv', _) <- execute (Run priv) (Private k : pc)
(publ', _) <- execute (Run publ) (Public k : pc)
return (Q k priv' publ', pc)
As in our formal calculus, the definition consists of three cases divided by the
symbol |. The first cases are triggered when pc can observe only the private (see
rule [f-run-facet-1]) or public facet (see rule [f-run-facet-2]), respectively.
When it comes to the otherwise case, the MF executor sequentially evaluates
the private and public facets, respectively—observe the recursive calls with the
pcs Private k : pc and Public k : pc, respectively. The resulting faceted value,
Q k priv' publ' (aka 〈k ? priv' : publ'〉), is constructed with the result of these evalu-
ations. This implementation corresponds to the applications of rules [f-thread-1],
then [f-thread-2], and finally [f-merge] in our calculus.
MF-par executor We also implement a slight variation of the MF executor
above called the MF-par executor. This executor essentially runs the private
and public sub-computations in parallel, which then gives different performance
characteristics. Observe that this variation is supported by our formal framework
in Section 3.3.
3.8.4 Continuations and SME
We now turn to trying to implement our SME executor for the same represen-
tation of programs used above. However, we run into a problem, it is impossible
to make the executor correspond to the calculus. The key observation is that
when spawning the new thread, we not only want to execute the instruction
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Run priv under the pc Private k : pc but also the rest of the program! Imagine
we wish to execute the program Run (Q k priv pub) :>>=: rest. If we just execute
fork (execute (Run priv) (Private k : pc)) under the otherwise guard, we will end
up not running rest for the private view. The problem lies in the interaction
between :>>=: and Run. More precisely, when evaluating Run, the executor has no
access to the “rest of the program.” Note that evaluation contexts denote the rest
of the program, so this problem does not exist in our formal semantics and only
materialises in practise.
There are two possible solutions to the problem outlined above, the first is to
change the type of the executors to reflect the need for keeping track of the “rest
of the program” via continuations. Unfortunately, the new type quickly becomes
cluttered.
Instead, we choose a simpler approach: to remove the troublesome (:>>=:)
construct without loosing any expressive power in our language. For that, we apply
a known technique for domain-specific languages (DSL) [12] for deriving alternate
implementations of APIs. In a nutshell, what we will do is to replace the constructor
Run with a new one called RunBind such that its semantics is determined by the
equation RunBind fac rest ≡ (Run fac) :>>=: rest. We change our implementation
of FIO as follows.
data FIO a where
Return :: a -> FIO a
RunBind :: Fac (FIO a) -> (Fac a -> FIO b) -> FIO b
-- Primitives for references and I/O
...
The type form of RunBind arises from its semantics definition. We can now soundly
derive an implementation of a bind function
(>>=) :: FIO a -> (a -> FIO b) -> FIO b by simply applying RunBind’s semantics.
In other words, whatever FIO-program was built before using the constructor
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:>>=:, it can be obtained with function (>>=) without changing its semantics—see
Appendix 3.B for details.
With this new representation, we can write the behavior of RunBind for SME.
execute (RunBind (Q k priv pub) rest) pc
...
| otherwise -> do
fork (execute (RunBind priv rest) (Private k : pc))
execute (RunBind pub rest) (Public k : pc)
Observe that rest contains “the rest of the program”, which then gets evaluated
twice as expected, i.e., once for each view. The MF executor is also easily adjusted
to accomodate this new representation—see Appendix 3.B for the details.
3.8.5 FSME executor
Implementing the FSME executor requires careful thought. It involves setting
a timeout that, when triggered, causes the execution to be split into two separate
executions. The splitting, however, needs to be done in a safe manner, e.g., not
in the middle of an output. To achieve that, when hitting the otherwise guard,
our executor spawns a thread to compute the private facet, send the result to a
pre-determined location, and wait for what to do next. In contrast, the thread for
the public facet sets a timeout to check if the result of the private facet arrived on
time. If that is the case, then the thread for the public facet indicates to the private
one to terminate; otherwise, it sends a signal to compute the "rest of the program"
in the separate thread. The notion of the continuation in the constructor RunBind
turns out to be essential to implementing this approach. Unfortunately, explaining
the implementation of this executor requires explaining some synchronisation and
concurrency primitives in Haskell. For the sake of brevity, we refer to the interested
reader to Appendix 3.C for the details.
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Figure 3.6: Time and memory consumption for different micro-benchmarks
3.9 Evaluation
We next evaluate the performance of our four executors (MF, MF-par, SME, and
FSME) on several micro-benchmarks. Suppose we have n principals/actors, which
we formalize as n incomparable labels l1, . . . , ln ∈ Lattice. Let si = 〈li ? . . . : . . .〉
be a string secret to label li. Then the concatenation of these n strings generates a
faceted tree s with height n and 2n leaves. Computations over s thus may generate
N = 2n subcomputations over the leaves, and so we use s as a suitable faceted
value to stress the implementation of RunBind’s otherwise guard.
We now define an expensive function on faceted values.
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benchmark1 :: Int -> Fac String -> FIO (Fac String)
benchmark1 n fac =
RunBind (Bind fac
(\s -> Raw (Return (hashes n s))))
Return
This function takes a faceted value and computes nested hashes on all its leaves.
Function hashes n s computes n nested SHA256 hashes of the string s.
Figure 3.6a shows the performance characteristics for our executors when
executing (benchmark1 100000 s). The measurements were taken on a 2.8GHz 4
core Intel Core i7-7700HQ processor. Note that the MF-par, SME, and FSME
executors run roughly 4 times faster than MF, due to parallelism. Interestingly,
the memory consumption, measured in peak resident set size, is significantly larger
for MF-par and SME than for MF. This is a result of SME spawning additional
threads which need to be represented in the Haskell runtime, whereas the MF
executor only keeps the current task in memory.
The performance of FSME sits between MF and SME, obtaining the best of
both worlds. Figure 3.6a shows that FSME gains speedup while keeping memory
consumption close to MF most of the time. What we observe is that the timeout
mechanism implemented by FSME is triggered early enough to obtain only a few
threads. From that point on, the program is run in parallel; however, within the
threads, the execution continues mainly under a MF semantics, i.e., the timeout
mechanisms subsequently does not get triggered frequently. These results were
obtained with a timeout of 1.5 seconds.
We also ran the same benchmark described above for timeouts varying from
0 to 20 seconds, going from full SME closer to MF. Figure 3.6b shows the result
of this experiment. The graphs go from red, indicating a low timeout (SME-like
semantics), to blue indicating a large timeout (MF-like semantics). Interestingly,
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imposing any non-zero timeout, 1 second in the example, drastically reduces
memory consumption. This is also the case for even smaller timeouts, like 0.25
and 0.1 seconds.
It is worth noting that while variations in timeout impact performance, the
security implications of the timeout are not as severe. Regardless of the length of
the timeout, non-terminating computations will always encounter it. However, if
we take terminating computations, and we take a sufficiently long timeout, we can
run everything just as MF.
The performance of SME versus MF seen so far may give the impression that
SME is always faster than MF at the cost of an increased memory footprint.
However, Figure 3.6c shows evidence of the contrary. For this benchmark, instead
of taking the hash of the faceted value, we take the hash of a constant value after
branching on a faceted one.
benchmark2 :: Int -> Fac () -> FIO (String)
benchmark2 n fac =
RunBind (Bind fac
(\() -> Raw (Return ()))
(\f -> Return (hashes n "hello"))
In this benchmark, SME is exponentially slower than MF. The reason for
this is that every time that benchmark2 branches on a faceted value, it duplicates
the continuation (\f -> Return (hashes n "hello")). As a result, the expensive
computation (hashes n "hello") executes many times even though it does not
depend on the faceted value. MF, MF-par, and FSME, on the other hand, run all
the inexpensive computation first (i.e., Raw (Return ())), i.e., once for every leaf in
the faceted value, and subsequently executes the hashing function only once.
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3.10 ProtectedBox
In order to demonstrate the viability of our framework for building practical
IFC systems, we have implemented a prototype service called ProtectedBox.
ProtectedBox is a essentially an API for the cloud storage solution Dropbox [18]
that makes possible to securely write and execute (mutually distrust) third-party
plugins on users’ files. Plugins are written in extended with I/O primitives
specific to the Dropbox API [19].
3.10.1 Labeling policy
File owners specifies how information can be shared with different plugins.
Initially, every file in User’s folders are labeled as {〈User, User〉}, thus indicating
that the files are confidential to the principal (or source of authority) User and
that User is responsible for its content. We consider plugins as another source of
authority. In this light, a given plugin named Plugin is considered a principal
whose initial PC corresponds to {〈⊥, Plugin〉}—so the plugin does not have any
confidentiality requirements a priori. Below, we describe three plugins that we
implemented for ProtectedBox as well as the labeling discipline that they follow.
I Comments: this plugin allows the user to add comments to a file. The comments
are stored in a different file with label 〈User,User ∨ Comments〉. This indicates
that the content of the comments is confidential to the user, but might have been
affected by either the user or the plugin.
I Tarball: this plugin creates a tarball of several files. The tarball is labeled
with the least upper bound of all the files in the tarball joined with 〈⊥,Tarball〉
to indicate that the plugin may have influenced the contents of the files, i.e., the
tarball gets the label (⊔ lf ) unionsq 〈⊥,Tarball〉.
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I Checksum: This plugin computes the SHA256 hash of a file and saves it to
another file. The file created by the plugin is labeled as lf unionsq 〈⊥,Checksum〉. This
means that the checksum is as confidential as the file it comes from but that
Checksum might have influenced its content.
Plugins are restricted from arbitrarily querying information about folders (e.g., list
of files) and files (e.g., update time, etc.) in order to avoid leaks of information
via many different covert channels [30]. Instead, they have access to the following
file-specific API and, of course, the primitives of our framework.
-- Interact with user files
createFile :: Label -> String -> String -> FIO ()
writeFile :: String -> String -> FIO ()
readFile :: String -> FIO (Faceted (Maybe String))
A read operation on a file with label l returns the faceted value 〈l ? contents :⊥〉.
Similarly, writes to a file with label l only happens if l ∈ views(pc), similarly to
the semantics of put. The same goes for creating files, a file can only be created if
its label is in the view of the PC.
3.10.2 Performance
We have evaluated the performance overheads associated with our executors in
ProtectedBox. We have five different FIO executors, MF, MF-par, SME, FSME,
and STD. The latter is analogous to std−→ in that it never introduces faceted
values, only deals with raw values, and provides no security guarantees.
Figure 3.7 shows the performance characteristics when running the Tarball
plugin on up to 30 files. As can be seen from the figure, our secure executors (MF,
MF-par, SME, FSME) do not introduce extraneous overheads over the unsecure
STD executor. All executors had the same memory footprint in this experiment.
92
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
N
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
W
al
lC
lo
ck
Ti
m
e
in
se
co
nd
s
Wall Clock Time
MF
MF-par
SME
FSME
STD
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
N
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
U
se
rT
im
e
in
se
co
nd
s
User Time
MF
MF-par
SME
FSME
STD
Figure 3.7: Time for different executors in the Tarball benchmark, where N is
the number of files.
The total memory overhead was small, measured in a few hundred KB at most.
This benchmark provides evidence that, in the case of non-malicious plug-ins, the
performance is similar for the different multi-execution approaches. Malicious code,
however, may stress the system in ways like what is shown in Section 3.9.
The performance is dominated by network overheads. For this reason it is
important that the safe executors do not introduce large numbers of sequential
requests. The code under test in Figure 3.7 does not display such weakness. It is
possible to construct programs similar to the first benchmark in Section 3.9 which
introduce an exponential number of network requests, these programs degrade
performance differently under MF, MF-par, SME and FSME in a way similar to
the results in Section 3.9. However, due to throttling from the Dropbox API we
have been unable to thoroughly evaluate scenarios of this kind in ProtectedBox,
but tentative experiments suggest that the effect exist.
3.11 Related work
SME The idea of utilizing multi-executions to secure programs has been inde-
pendently proposed by many researchers. Capizzi et al. [10] propose running two
copies of the same program, so called shadow executions: one for public and other
for handling private data, respectively. Cristiá and Mata independently formalize
a similar system at the operating system level [13]. Devriese and Piessens [17]
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coin the term SME and are the first to formalise the soundness and precision
guarantees of the approach. Different from our approach, the original formulation
of SME is black-box, i.e, language independent, which makes it possible to deploy
it for complex languages like JavaScript. Jaskelioff and Russo [24] present an
implementation of SME in Haskell in less than 150 lines of code. Barthe et al. [6]
propose a program that inlines SME into JavaScript-like programs—so that it is
not necessary to modify the runtime system to obtain multi-executions. We believe
that our contributions could be used to extend the approaches above to work on
decentralized labels as well as obtaining multi-executions “on-demand.” When it
comes to applications, the web has been the chosen domain to test SME ideas [8]
and their implementations, e.g., FlowFox [14]. The implementation accompanying
[8] handles SME for a specific infinite lattice with levels L (public or bottom), H
(secret or top), andM(d) for every incomparable web domain d. When receiving an
event from an unseen domain, the enforcement creates a copy of the browser’s state
which gets initialized with the L-state—which is only suitable under the considered
lattice. Instead, our work allows for more general infinite lattices and initialization
of multi-executions’ states without loosing soundness or transparency guarantees.
SME has also been successfully applied to the map-reduce programming model
[40]. When it comes to security guarantees, secure programs interpreted under
SME produce the same outputs as if they were run under a standard semantics
modulo the relative ordering of observable events from different security levels. The
work in [28] explores how different scheduling policies affect the security guarantees
provided by SME, i.e., TINI or TSNI. In [57, 43], the authors combine scheduling
techniques with monitoring approaches to guarantee that interleaving of events
gets preserved for secure programs. The authors of [43, 53] provide means for
declassification. While our framework does not present means for declassification,
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we state as future work adapting such techniques for a functional language.
MF Austin and Flanagan introduce MF semantics [5], where authors refer to it
as an optimization for SME. Schmitz et al. [46] show an implementation of MF
in Haskell—part of that design inspired ours. Bielova and Rezk [7] later show
that SME and MF are actually different: they differ on the provided security
guarantees (i.e., TINI vs. TSNI) and the treatment of default values. They
propose an all-or-nothing combination of MF and SME using a non-decidable
semantics—which takes decisions based on the termination behavior of commands.
Their enforcement run programs under a MF semantics but switches to SME (with
a low priority scheduler) when commands inside a branch do not terminate. In
the same all-or-nothing spirit, Ngo et al. [41] combine MF and SME techniques for
a simple while-language, where timeouts are set to determine when to switch to
SME. These works and ours share similar goals, but the underlying mechanisms are
entirely different. One obvious difference is that we use a monad-based operational
semantics vs. a while-like language. From the enforcement perspective, our
technique uses a decidable semantics (unlike [7]) and spawns multi-executions
on-demand while [41] does not, thus duplicating memory and execution of code.
Furthermore, their switching mechanism between MF and SME requires knowledge
of all points in the lattice, something which is not feasible in decentralized lattices
like DC-labels (or DLM). Different from that work, supports decentralized
labeling models and it does not spawn as many threads as security labels when
providing termination-sensitive guarantees. Schoepe et al. [47] investigate how to
apply MF semantics to encode taint analysis.
IFC libraries Many IFC security libraries exists for Haskell. They can enforce
non-interference statically [31, 44, 54, 2], dynamically [49], or as a combination
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of both [16, 9]. Many of these libraries utilize the concept of monads to control
the side-effects that programs are allowed to perform. Differently from them, our
work (library) uses monads to adapt programs semantics to MF, SME, or FSME.
3.12 Conclusions
MF and SME are two promising approaches to dynamic IFC that provide
complementary benefits—MF provides better performance, whereas SME provides
stronger termination-sensitive security guarantees. This paper provides the unifying
framework , a synthesis of both prior approaches in the form of both a unifying
formal semantics and a corresponding Haskell IFC library. Using , we have
developed Faceted Secure Multi Execution, which combines the performance
benefits and termination-sensitive guarantees of MF and SME, respectively. In
addition, our work supports decentralized labels, necessary in many realistic
settings.
We believe the our mechanically-verified semantics and IFC library provide
a solid foundation for the future development of extensions as well as realistic
applications with strong IFC-based security guarantees. We envision as future work
to extend to support exceptions and timing-sensitive guarantees. Specifically,
we expect to need some mechanism for propagating exceptions across threads for
MF- and FSME-based multi-executions. On the other hand, when it comes to
timing guarantees, we believe it is possible to leverage some existing results to
make FSME robust against timing leaks—perhaps by assuming a specific scheduler
[28], or perhaps by padding the sensitive computations by the chosen timeout [3].
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Appendix 3.A Semantics and Proof Sketches
This appendix presents the full syntax, type system, and semantics of our
language as well as our security guarantee results and proof sketches. The full
syntax can be found in Figures 3.8 and 3.9 along with the semantics in Figures 3.10
and 3.11 and the type system in Figure 3.12. Figure 3.13 shows the full standard
semantics. Next we go through our security guarantees as well as their respective
proof sketches.
Theorem 2 (Termination-Insensitive Non-Interference).
If σ1 ≈l σ2 and σ1 −→∗∅ σ′1 6−→∅ and σ2 −→∗∅ σ′2 6−→∅ then σ′1 ≈l σ′2.
Proof sketch
By repeated application of Projection 1, and by using Projection 2, we have
σ1↓l std−→∗ σ′1↓l 6 std−→ and σ2↓l std−→∗ σ′2↓l 6 std−→ . Since std−→ is deterministic and
σ1 ≈l σ2, therefore σ′1 ≈l σ′2, as desired. 
Theorem 3 (Fair Projection).
If σ↓l std−→ σ1 then ∃σ2, s2. (σ, s) fair−→∗ (σ2, s2) and σ2↓l = σ1.
Proof sketch
By strong induction on measure(l, σ), which is roughly defined as the sum of 2depth
of each occurence of 〈• ? • : •〉 or [〈〈• ? • : •〉〉] in the program, ignoring subterms that
are not visible to l and ignoring the right hand subterms of any occurrences of bind.
This number represents an upper bound on the number of invisible (to l) steps
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that σ can take. Also, do induction on the number n mentioned in the definition
of Fairness. 
Theorem 4 (Termination-Sensitive Non-Interference).
If σ1 ≈l σ2 and (σ1, s1) fair−→∗ (σ′1, s′1) then ∃σ′2, s′2. (σ2, s2) fair−→∗ (σ′2, s′2) and σ′1 ≈l
σ′2.
Proof sketch
By Scheduler Validity, we have σ1 −→∗∅ σ′1. By Projection 1, we have σ1↓l std−→∗ σ′1↓l.
Now because σ1 ≈l σ2, we have σ2↓l std−→∗ σ′1↓l. By Fair Projection, we have
∃σ′2, s′2.(σ2, s2) fair−→∗ (σ′2, s′2) and σ′2 ≈l σ′1, as desired. 
Definition 1 (Non-interfering). We say that a program (i.e., a non-faceted term) t
is non-interfering when the following is the case. For all l, I1, I2, σ1, if I1 ≈l I2 and
(t, ∅, λi.0, I1, λo.) std−→∗ σ1 then there exists σ2 such that (t, ∅, λi.0, I2, λo.) std−→∗ σ2
and σ2 ≈l σ1. 
Theorem 5 (Transparency).
If t is non-interfering and σ = (t, ∅, λi.0, I, λo.) std−→∗ σ′ then there exists σ′′, s′′
such that (σ, s) fair−→∗ (σ′′, s′′) and σ′ ≈l σ′′.
Proof sketch
Since t = t↓l is non-interfering, we have σ′′′ such that σ↓l std−→∗ σ′′′ and σ′ ≈l
σ′′′. By repeated application of Fair Projection, we have σ′′ and s′′ such that
(σ, s) fair−→∗ (σ′′, s′′) and σ′′↓l = σ′′′. Finally, σ′↓l = σ′′′↓l = σ′′↓l↓l = σ′′↓l, as
desired. 
Theorem 6 (Emptiness check).
∀pc. views(pc) 6= ∅ ⇔ ∀k ∈ pc. k 6v lc(pc)
104
Proof Sketch Right-to-left holds trivially by the definition of the candidate label.
In the other direction we have that for any l ∈ views(pc), it is the case that
lc(pc) v l by simple properties of the join, i.e., as lc(pc) computes the least upper
bound of the positive labels in pc, and ∀k ∈ pc. k 6v l by (6). We will prove
the theorem by contradiction. Assume that ¬(∀k ∈ pc. k 6v lc(pc)), we then
have ∃k ∈ pc. k v lc(pc). Let us take k0 to be the witness of this existential
quantification. We obtain, by transitivity of (v), k0 v lc(pc) v l, but l ∈ views(pc)
which implies that k0 6v l, contradiction. 
Appendix 3.B Implementation
DC labels, see section 3.7.1, are represented as a Haskell data type:
data Form = T | F | And Form Form | Or Form Form | Atomic String
data Label = Label Form Form
Where Label (Atomic "a" `Or` Atomic "b") (Atomic "b") denotes a DC label
〈a∨ b, b〉. Similarly, faceted values are represented as a Generalised Algebraic Data
Type:
data Fac a where
Raw :: a -> Fac a
Bind :: Fac a -> (a -> Fac b) -> Fac b
Q :: Label -> Fac a -> Fac a -> Fac a
Where Q l priv pub represents the faceted value 〈l ? priv : pub〉. We represent FIO
references using Haskell’s mutable IORef references.
data Ref a = Ref (IORef (Fac a))
Channels are represented using file handles and mutable references:
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data Ch = Ch { label :: Label, iH :: Handle
, iPtr :: IORef (Fac Int), oH :: Handle }
FIO computations are represented as a deep embedding in a continuation-passing
style. Representing the computation as a concrete data type allows us to implement
multiple different executors for the same syntax.
data FIO a where
RunBind :: Fac (FIO a) -> (Fac a -> FIO b) -> FIO b
New :: Fac a -> (Ref a -> FIO b) -> FIO b
Read :: Ref a -> (Fac a -> FIO b) -> FIO b
Write :: Ref a -> Fac a -> (() -> FIO b) -> FIO b
Get :: Ch -> (Fac Char -> FIO b) -> FIO b
Put :: Ch -> Char -> (() -> FIO a) -> FIO a
Return :: a -> FIO a
We proceed to implement the interface for side-effectful operations based on FIO
constructors as follows:
newFIORef :: Fac a -> FIO (Ref a)
newFIORef f = New f Return
readFIORef :: Ref a -> FIO (Fac a)
readFIORef r = Read r Return
The other operations are implemented analogously.
Note that the primitives Read, New and Write support continuations, as motivated
in Section 3.8.4. Based on these continuation-based primitives, we implement
non-continuation-based wrappers that have the expected type matching Figure
3.12.
The return and (>>=) constructs are implemented as derived operations (they
are usually provided as parts of the standard Monad interface) [55, 27].
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(>>=) :: FIO a -> (a -> FIO b) -> FIO b
Return a >>= k = k a
RunBind f c >>= k = RunBind f (\a -> c a >>= k)
New f c >>= k = New f (\a -> c a >>= k)
Read r c >>= k = Read r (\a -> c a >>= k)
...
The program counter (PC) is implemented as a list of branches.
data Branch = Private Label | Public Label
type PC = [Branch]
The decision procedure from section 3.7 is implemented as pure Haskell function
making use a library for BDDs:
isEmptyViews :: PC -> Bool
isEmptyViews pc =
let lc = foldr lub (Label T F) [ k | Private k <- pc ]
in not (and [ canFlowTo k lc | Public k <- pc ])
We have implemented two different executors for FIO, mf, sme. All the ex-
ecutors have the same type, FIO a -> PC -> IO (a, PC), a function from an FIO
computation and a program counter to a result and a new program counter in the
IO monad. The definition of mf is straight forward:
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mf :: FIO a -> PC -> IO (a,PC)
mf (Return a) pc = return (a, pc)
mf (New fac k) pc = do ref <- newIORef fac
mf (k (Ref ref)) pc
mf (Read (Ref ref) k) pc = do fac <- readIORef ref
mf (k fac) pc
mf (Write (Ref ref) fac k) pc = do
atomicModifyIORef' ref $
\old_fac -> (pcF pc fac old_fac, ())
mf (k ()) pc
mf (Get i k) pc = do ptr <- readIORef (iPtr i)
(val, ptr') <- fac_get pc (iH i) ptr
writeIORef (iPtr i) ptr'
mf (k val) pc
mf (Put o v k) pc
| label o `inViews` pc = do hPutChar (oH o) v
mf k pc
| otherwise = mf k pc
mf (RunBind (Raw fio) k) pc = do (a, pc') <- mf fio pc
mf (k (Raw a)) pc
mf (RunBind (Bind (Raw fio) c) k) pc = mf (RunBind (c fio) k) pc
mf (RunBind (Bind (Bind t0 c0) c1) k) pc =
mf (RunBind (Bind t0 (\x -> Bind (c0 x) c1)) k) pc
mf (RunBind (Q l priv pub) k) pc
| isEmptyViews (Public l : pc) = mf (RunBind priv k) pc
| isEmptyViews (Private l : pc) = mf (RunBind pub k) pc
| otherwise = do
(a1,_) <- mf (RunBind priv return) (Private l : pc)
(a2,_) <- mf (RunBind pub return) (Public l : pc)
mf (k (Q l a1 a2)) pc
108
The function pcF used in the case for Write implements the notation 〈〈pc ? priv : pub〉〉
from Section 3.3.
In the case for Return we just return the value and the current PC. For New
we create a new IORef and run the continuation k with that IORef wrapped in a
Ref constructor. Similarly for Read, read the value of the reference and run the
continuation. The case for Write is more interesting, when we are a value to a
reference we need to update the current faceted value to reflect that the update
is done with the current PC. Writes are executed atomically; while this is not
important for the defintion of mf (which is sequential), it matters in concurrent
executors like sme below. The two cases for Run depend on the faceted value being
branched over. If the value is a leaf (Raw fio), we execute the FIO computation at
the leaf and continue with the continutation. If the value is a branch (Q l priv pub),
we check the branching conditions described in Section 3.3 and execute one of three
cases. The first two cases simply pick the private or public branches depending on
if the specific branching condition is satisfied. The third case is more interesting,
we run both the public and the private branches with different PCs, each containing
either Private l or Public l. Note that this is a literal translation of the
The definition of sme is identical except for the clause for Get, where we use a
lock to ensure that the file pointers are not concurrently updated, and the final
clause of the definition for Run:
sme (RunBind (Q l priv pub) k) pc
...
| otherwise = do
forkIO . void $ sme (RunBind priv k) (Private l : pc)
sme (RunBind pub k) (Public l : pc)
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Instead of first running the private branch and then the public, we fork the
private branch to run in parallel and continue with the public branch. Note that
the use of forkIO . void is a technicality, the type of forkIO requires a computation
of type IO () as argumentand void as type IO a -> IO ().
Appendix 3.C FSME (switching) executor
The rule [f-fork-continuation] in the semantics models switching from
a single thread of execution to multiple threads. In this appendix we show
how the rule can be implemented in a switching executor. The only difference
between the executor we develop here and the sme and mf variants are in the
implementation of the case for RunBind which needs to run both the private and the
public computations. The idea of this executor is to run the private computation
assuming it is going to terminate. If the private computation does not terminate
we start running the public computation in parallel with the private and continue
by doing SME. The way this is achieved by our executor, which can be seen
below, is by executing the the private computation in a separate, lightweight,
thread. The thread running the private computation communicates the result of
the computation to the main thread when finished. It then waits for the main
thread to tell it to either terminate or continue running the continuation. The
main thread waits for the result of the private computation for a bounded amount
of time. If the main thread receives the result of the computation on time, then it
continues running in the fashion of MF. If the main thread does not receive the
result on time, then it signals the thread running the private computation to run
its continuation, and the execution continues in the fashion of SME.
The necessary communication is achieved using the MVar data structure. A value
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of type MVar a [42] is a concurrent datastructure which is either empty or contains
a term of type a. An empty MVar is created using newEmptyMVar :: IO (MVar a).
The function readMVar empties a full MVar and returns its content or blocks other-
wise. The function putMVar :: a -> MVar a -> IO () fills an empty MVar or blocks
otherwise.
fsme (RunBind (Q k priv pub) f) pc =
...
| otherwise = do
privResult <- newEmptyMVar
privCont <- newEmptyMVar
fork $ do -- Private facet behavior
(priv', pc') <- fsme (RunBind priv Return) (Private k : pc)
putMVar privResult priv'
-- Wait for what to do next
switchSME <- readMVar privCont
when switchSME $ void (fsme (k priv') pc')
-- Public facet behavior
onTime <- timeout waitTime (readMVar privResult)
case onTime of
Just priv' -> do -- No need to switch to SME
putMVar switchSME False
fsme (RunBind publ (\publ' -> f (Q p priv' publ')))
(Public p : pc)
Nothing -> do -- Switching to SME
putMVar switchSME True
fsme (RunBind publ f) (Public p : pc)
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n ∈ Z
k, l ∈ Lattice
b ∈ Branch ::= k | k
pc ∈ PC = 2Branch
V ∈ FacetedValue ::= raw t
| 〈k ?V :V 〉
| bind t t
x ∈ Var
t ∈ Term ::= x
| λx.t | t t
| a
| n | t+ t
| if t t t
| V
| return t | t>>= t
| new t | read t | write t t
| get i | put o t
| run t
| [〈〈k ? t : t〉〉]
T ∈ Type ::= Int
| T → T
| Fac T
| FIO T
| FIORef T
Γ ∈ VarTypes = Var → Type
Figure 3.8: Full syntax (part I).
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a ∈ Address
i ∈ InputHandle
o ∈ OutputHandle
l i ∈ Lattice is the label of the channel i
lo ∈ Lattice is the label of the channel o
v ∈ Value ::= V
| λx.t
| n
| a
| return v
E ∈ Context ::= • t
| bind • t
| •+ t | v + •
| if • t t
| •>>= t
| run • | run (bind • t)
| new • | read • | write • t | write a •
| put o •
| return •
M ∈ Memory = Address → FacetedValue
p ∈ BufferPointer ::= n | 〈k ? p : p〉
P ∈ BufferPointers = InputHandle → BufferPointer
ns ∈ Sequence = Z∗
I ∈ InputBuffer = InputHandle → Sequence
O ∈ OutputBuffer = OutputHandle → Sequence
σ ∈ State ::= (t,M, P, I, O)
∆ ∈ MemoryTypes = Address → Type
Figure 3.9: Full syntax (part II).
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[t-var]
Γ,∆ ` x :: Γ(x)
[t-lam]
Γ[x :=T1],∆ ` t2 :: T2
Γ,∆ ` λx.t2 :: T1 → T2
[t-app]
Γ,∆ ` t0 :: T1 → T2 Γ,∆ ` t1 :: T1
Γ,∆ ` t0 t1 :: T2
[t-addr]
Γ,∆ ` a :: ∆(a)
[t-int]
Γ,∆ ` n :: Int
[t-plus]
Γ,∆ ` t1 :: Int Γ,∆ ` t2 :: Int
Γ,∆ ` t1 + t2 :: Int
[t-if]
Γ,∆ ` t0 :: Int Γ,∆ ` t1 :: T Γ,∆ ` t2 :: T
Γ,∆ ` if t0 t1 t2 :: T
[t-raw]
Γ,∆ ` t :: T
Γ,∆ ` raw t :: Fac T
[t-facet]
Γ,∆ ` V1 :: Fac T Γ,∆ ` V2 :: Fac T
Γ,∆ ` 〈k ?V1 :V2〉 :: Fac T
[t-bind-fac]
Γ,∆ ` t1 :: Fac T1 Γ,∆ ` t2 :: T1 → Fac T2
Γ,∆ ` bind t1 t2 :: Fac T2
[t-return]
Γ,∆ ` t :: T
Γ,∆ ` return t :: FIO T
[t-bind-fio]
Γ,∆ ` t1 :: FIO T1 Γ,∆ ` t2 :: T1 → FIO T2
Γ,∆ ` t1>>= t2 :: FIO T2
[t-new]
Γ,∆ ` t :: Fac T
Γ,∆ ` new t :: FIO (FIORef T )
[t-read]
Γ,∆ ` t :: FIORef T
Γ,∆ ` read t :: FIO (Fac T )
[t-write]
Γ,∆ ` t1 :: FIORef T Γ,∆ ` t2 :: Fac T
Γ,∆ ` write t1 t2 :: FIO (Fac T )
[t-get]
Γ,∆ ` get i :: FIO (Fac Int)
[t-put]
Γ,∆ ` t :: Int
Γ,∆ ` put o t :: FIO Int
[t-run]
Γ,∆ ` t :: Fac (FIO T )
Γ,∆ ` run t :: FIO (Fac T )
[t-threads]
Γ,∆ ` t1 :: FIO T Γ,∆ ` t2 :: FIO T
Γ,∆ ` [〈〈k ? t1 : t2〉〉] :: FIO T
Figure 3.12: Typing rules Γ,∆ ` t :: T
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Chapter 4
FacetBook
4.1 Research questions
An important goal for achieving security is to minimize the size of the trusted
computing base (TCB), which is the portion of code that must be carefully audited
for security [6]. (We refer to the remaining code as the untrusted computing base
(UCB).)
Our hypothesis is that faceted execution (as implemented by the FIO library)
makes it easier to minimize the size of the TCB in realistic applications. In
particular, we have two research questions:
1. Does FIO help minimize TCB size when coding a secure application?
2. Does FIO help minimize TCB size when changing an existing application to
meet new requirements?
Our experimental design to investigate these questions is as follows:
• Create Design V1 for a prototype application called FacetBook.
• Create Implementation V1-FIO using FIO, minimizing the TCB.
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Lines of code
Version FIO TCB UCB Total application-specific code
V1-FIO 108 99 352 451
V2-FIO 108 99 360 459
V1-NoFIO 0 118 295 413
V2-NoFIO 0 419 0 419
V2-NoFIO-minTCB 0 128 298 426
Table 4.1: The number of lines of code in each version of FacetBook. The
emphasized entries are useful for quantifying security.
• Create Implementation V1-NoFIO without FIO, minimizing the TCB.
• Measure TCB size of the two implementations.
• Create Design V2 by making a small change to Design V1.
• Create Implementation V2-FIO by modifying V1-FIO.
• Create Implementation V2-NoFIO by modifying V1-NoFIO.
• Create Implementation V2-NoFIO-minTCB from V2-NoFIO by minimizing
the TCB.
• Quantify the effect on security by comparing the increase in TCB size when
going from V1 to V2.
• Quantify the ease of achieving security by comparing the number of lines of
code changed when minimizing the TCB size in V2.
Table 4.1 shows the number of lines of code for each version. Table 4.2 shows the
number of edit actions required to change each version to the next. The full
source code is available at https://github.com/tommy-schmitz/facetbook. In
the sections below, we discuss these results.
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Changes (measured in lines of code)
Version Modified Moved Inserted Deleted
V1-FIO
V2-FIO 1 0 8 0
V1-NoFIO
V2-NoFIO 2 3 6 0
V2-NoFIO-minTCB 4 6 7 0
Table 4.2: The differences between each version of FacetBook. Each row in the
table lists the differences from the version in the row above it. The emphasized
entries are useful for quantifying ease of achieving security.
4.2 Design V1: FacetBook
4.2.1 Overview
FacetBook is a prototype social networking website. Users can submit posts
(pieces of text that are visible to a subset of other users of the website) and can
play Tic Tac Toe with other users, which is a simple and well-known game that
children commonly play using pencil and paper. (In this case, the game is played
using two computers equipped with web browsers and mouse pointer devices.)
For the purposes of our experiment, the “posts” feature exists so that FacetBook
has a rich TCB (because the information flow requirements are complex), while the
“Tic Tac Toe” feature exists so that it has a rich UCB (because the information
flow requirements are simple, but the other computations are relatively complex).
4.2.2 User interface
Figure 4.1 illustrates the structure of FacetBook’s webpages.
The login page allows typing a username and clicking the “Submit” button to
go to the dashboard page. For simplicity, authentication always succeeds with no
password required—sophisticated authentication machinery would remain constant
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throughout all six versions of FacetBook, and so would simply add a constant
number of lines of code to the TCB. Unlike other work [3], we make no attempt
here to remove authentication code (i.e. password-checking code) from the TCB.
The dashboard page shows a list of 20 recent posts created by users of
FacetBook. The list comes from the server’s database of all posts, but con-
tains only those that the currently authenticated user is permitted to view. The
page also has two links: one going to the post page and one to the tictactoe
page.
The post page allows users to compose posts, and so has a form with two fields:
the permissions field expects a space-delimited list of usernames indicating who
is allowed to see the post, and the content field expects any string. Upon clicking
“Submit,” the form is submitted via HTTP POST protocol to the /post endpoint,
and the server saves the submitted data in a database.
The tictactoe page initially shows a form with a single field partner expecting
the username of the person with whom to play Tic Tac Toe. Upon clicking “Submit,”
the Tic Tac Toe board and its controls appear on the page. If this pair of users
(the currently authenticated user and the specified partner) has never played Tic
Tac Toe together before, then the server begins by adding a fresh game to the list
of ongoing games in the database. Then the server retrieves the game (whether
freshly-created or pre-existing) from the database and renders it into HTML when
serving the page. Thereafter, if the user clicks on the controls of the game, then
the web browser sends a request (using Javascript) specifying what action to take,
and the server updates the game in the database as appropriate. Then the server
replies with updated HTML, which replaces (using Javascript) the display in the
browser.
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4.2.3 Information security
In FacetBook, restricted information arrives via HTTP POST protocol at the
/post endpoint. This endpoint is how users express their information flow desires,
namely that only the users specified in the permissions field can know about this
post and its content (in the content field).
The restricted output channel is the server’s response to any incoming HTTP
request—unless that request contains credentials of an appropriate user. In
FacetBook, requests specify credentials in the HTTP GET parameter username
(rather than in a cookie).
These information security specifications implicitly define a specific attacker
model that considers some potential attacks and ignores others. Notably, our
model ignores the correctness of the user interface, which is important because
we intend to place the client code in the UCB. If an attacker controls the UCB,
then the attacker could interfere with the creation of the POST request by, for
instance, adding an extra entry to the permissions field before submitting the
POST request. In the design of FacetBook, we explicitly ignore such an attack
and choose instead to assume that the POST parameters received at the server
correctly reflect the user’s intentions.
4.3 FIO library
Figure 4.2 shows the interface of the FIO library. The main difference from
Chapter 2 is that this code now supports using an arbitrary security lattice [5],
rather than specifically a power set security lattice over the set of Strings. As
a result, the type constructors Fac, FIORef, FIO, and PC now take an additional
type parameter for specifying the security lattice. The corresponding Lattice
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1 class Lattice a where
2 leq :: a -> a -> Bool
3 lub :: a -> a -> a
4 bot :: a
5
6 data Fac l a where
7 Undefined :: Fac l a
8 Raw :: a -> Fac l a
9 Fac :: l -> Fac l a -> Fac l a -> Fac l a
10 BindFac :: Fac l a -> (a -> Fac l b) -> Fac l b
11
12 data FIORef l a = FIORef (IORef (Fac l a))
13
14 data FIO l a where
15 Return :: a -> FIO l a
16 BindFIO :: FIO l a -> (a -> FIO l b) -> FIO l b
17 Swap :: Fac l (FIO l a) -> FIO l (Fac l a)
18 IO :: l -> IO a -> FIO l a
19 New :: a -> FIO l (FIORef l a)
20 Read :: FIORef l a -> FIO l (Fac l a)
21 Write :: FIORef l a -> Fac l a -> FIO l ()
22
23 data PC l = PC [l] [l]
24
25 runFIO :: Lattice l => PC l -> FIO l a -> IO a
Figure 4.2: The interface of the FIO library in all versions of FacetBook.
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type class (lines 1 through 4) specifies the methods (leq, lub, and bot) that the
security lattice must implement.
In addition to the extra type parameter, we change slightly the representation
of the PC datatype, so now PC ks1 ks2 denotes the set of lattice elements k such
that
• k′ v k for all k′ ∈ ks1, and
• k′ 6v k for all k′ ∈ ks2.
The main library function is runFIO, which runs an FIO computation safely,
namely by respecting the information flow requirements specified by any faceted
values used in the computation. The computation bifurcates if necessary.
The FIO library contains 108 lines of code. (Only the interface is shown in
Figure 4.2.)
4.4 V1-FIO
FacetBook V1-FIO is the initial version of the code, which implements Design
V1, uses the FIO library, and is organized so as to minimize the size of the TCB.
4.4.1 Tour of TCB
Security lattice
The lattice of security labels is defined in Figure 4.3. The label Bot is for
public data; the label Whitelist users is for data visible only to the users listed
in the list users. The datatype Label forms a lattice, as evidenced by the type
class instance Lattice Label and its three methods leq, lub, and bot.
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26 data Label = Whitelist [User]
27 | Bot
28 instance Lattice Label where
29 leq Bot _ = True
30 leq _ Bot = False
31 leq (Whitelist us1) (Whitelist us2) =
32 let subset xs ys = all (\x -> x `elem` ys) xs in
33 us2 `subset` us1
34 lub Bot k = k
35 lub k Bot = k
36 lub (Whitelist us1) (Whitelist us2) =
37 Whitelist (List.intersect us1 us2)
38 bot = Bot
Figure 4.3: The code for the Label datatype in all versions of FacetBook.
39 type Post = String
40 data FList a = Nil
41 | Cons a (Fac Label (FList a))
42 type PostList = FList Post
43 type Database = (FIORef Label PostList, FIORef Label [TicTacToe])
Figure 4.4: The code for the FList datatype and associated type definitions in
V1-FIO.
Database format
The database format is defined in Figure 4.4. For simplicity, we keep the
database in memory rather than on disk (unlike other work on using faceted values
with databases [7, 2]). The Database type is a pair of two mutable references
(FIORefs), one for holding the current list of posts and a second for holding the
current list of ongoing Tic Tac Toe games. The PostList type makes use of a
custom datatype FList, which is a singly-linked list datatype whose “next” pointer
is always faceted. The Post type is simply an alias for Haskell’s built-in String
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44 main :: IO ()
45 main = do --IO
46 database <- runFIO (Constraints [] []) $ do --FIO
47 r1 <- New Nil
48 r2 <- New []
49 return (r1, r2)
50 let port = 3000
51 Warp.run port $ \request respond -> do --IO
52 let (k1, k2) = policy request
53 let fio_respond = \x -> IO k2 $ do --IO
54 respond x
55 return ()
56 let faceted_request = Fac k1 (Raw request) Undefined
57 runFIO (Constraints [] []) $
58 UCB.handle_request faceted_request database fio_respond
59 return ResponseReceived
Figure 4.5: The code for the main function in V1-FIO.
type.
The faceted values in an FList potentially allow the “list” to be structured
actually as a tree with branching factor 2. However, in practice, when appending to
the list, each facet shares a suffix with the opposing facet, so in fact the structure
in memory forms a directed acyclic graph whose size is linear in the total number
of posts.
Main function
Figure 4.5 shows the main function. Its purpose is to start the web server and
set up appropriate security sandboxes before handling each request.
Line 47 initializes the database with an empty list of posts, and line 48 initializes
it with an empty list of Tic Tac Toe games. Line 51 creates a socket (using the
Haskell library function Warp.run) for listening for incoming HTTP requests, which
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60 policy :: WAI.Request -> (Label, Label)
61 policy request =
62 if WAI.pathInfo request == ["login"] then
63 (Bot, Bot)
64 else case check_credentials request of
65 Nothing ->
66 (Bot, Bot)
67 Just username -> case WAI.pathInfo request of
68 ["post"] ->
69 let permissions = get_parameter request "permissions" in
70 let users = words permissions in
71 if all valid_username users then
72 (Whitelist (username : users), Whitelist [username])
73 else
74 (Whitelist [username], Whitelist [username])
75 _ ->
76 (Bot, Whitelist [username])
Figure 4.6: The code for the policy function in V1-FIO.
are handled by the code on lines 52 through 59. Line 58 calls UCB.handle_request,
which is outside the TCB; however, its inputs (database, faceted_request, and
fio_respond) are all faceted appropriately, and its side effects are sandboxed
appropriately by runFIO (Constraints [] []) on line 57.
Policy function
The function policy (called on line 52) computes the appropriate labels to
use in FacetBook. Its code is shown in Figure 4.6. We parse the request to
determine its meaning, and then we return two labels: one for the confidentiality
of the request, and one for the label of the output channel for returning an HTTP
response to the user.
Specifically, this policy assigns Bot for both labels (lines 63 and 66) when the
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77 {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
78 module UCB where
79 import qualified Data.List as List
80 import Data.Monoid((<>))
81 import Data.String(fromString)
82 import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as ByteString(intercalate)
83 import Network.HTTP.Types.Status(status200, status404)
84 import qualified Network.Wai as WAI(Request, pathInfo, ResponseLBS)
85 import Shared
86 import FIO(FIO(Read, Write, Swap), Fac(), FIORef)
Figure 4.7: The import statements for the UCB module in V1-FIO.
user is not logged in, which is the case when requesting the login page (line 62)
or when lacking credentials on any other page (line 65). When the user has valid
credentials, the HTTP response label is Whitelist [username] (lines 72, 74, and
76), indicating that the response can contain private information belonging to the
authenticated user. For most pages, the confidentiality label on the request is
Bot (line 76), which means that the request itself carries no sensitive information;
however, on the "post" page, the label Whitelist (username : users) (line 72)
indicates that the request is visible only to the users named in the permissions
parameter of the request (and the currently authenticated user too). This label
ensures that when the submitted post is written to the database, it will be faceted
appropriately. The label Whitelist [username] on line 74 is used in case a client
sends a malformed request where the permissions parameter contains invalid
entries.
Import statements
The TCB includes the import statements at the top of each file. Primarily, we
must verify that the UCB module imports (Figure 4.7) do not include FIO(runFIO,
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87 {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
88 module Shared where
89 import Data.String(fromString)
90 import Data.ByteString.Char8(unpack)
91 import qualified Network.Wai as WAI(Request, queryString)
92 import qualified Data.List as List(intersect)
93 import FIO
Figure 4.8: The import statements for the Shared module in V1-FIO.
94 {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
95 module TCB where
96 import qualified Network.Wai.Handler.Warp as Warp(run)
97 import qualified Network.Wai as WAI(Request, pathInfo)
98 import Network.Wai.Internal(ResponseReceived(ResponseReceived))
99 import Shared
100 import FIO
101 import qualified UCB as UCB(handle_request)
Figure 4.9: The import statements for the TCB module in V1-FIO.
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102 check_credentials :: WAI.Request -> Maybe User
103 check_credentials request =
104 let username = get_parameter request "username" in
105 if valid_username username then Just username
106 else Nothing
107
108 get_parameter :: WAI.Request -> String -> String
109 get_parameter request key =
110 case lookup (fromString key) (WAI.queryString request) of
111 Just (Just value) -> unpack value
112 _ -> ""
113
114 valid_username :: String -> Bool
115 valid_username s =
116 s /= "" &&
117 all (\c -> (c>='0' && c<='9') ||
118 (c>='a' && c<='z') ||
119 (c>='A' && c<='Z') ||
120 c=='_' ) s
Figure 4.10: The code for the helper functions in V1-FIO.
FIO(IO), Fac(Raw, Fac, Undefined, BindFac)). As a result, these import
statements are actually part of the TCB.
The import statements in the TCB and Shared modules are also in the TCB,
naturally, and help auditors determine which standard libraries must be trusted.
Helper functions
For completeness, we include the TCB’s helper functions, which are shown in
Figure 4.10. check_credentials is the password-checking function. It gets the
username from the HTTP GET parameters. For simplicity, it always succeeds
without any password. When no username is supplied, it returns Nothing, indicat-
ing invalid credentials. get_parameter extracts an HTTP GET parameter from
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121 type Handler = Database -> (WAI.Response -> FIO ()) -> FIO ()
122 handle_request :: Fac Label WAI.Request -> Handler
123 handle_request faceted_request database respond = do --FIO
124 Swap $ do --Fac
125 request <- faceted_request
126 return $ do --FIO
127 let handler = parse_request request
128 handler database respond
129 return ()
Figure 4.11: The code for the handle_request function in V1-FIO.
a request. valid_username checks that a string is non-empty and contains only
letters, numbers, and underscores.
Summary
In summary, the TCB of FacetBook V1-FIO contains 99 lines: 41 in TCB.hs,
48 in Shared.hs, and 10 import statements in UCB.hs.
4.4.2 Tour of UCB
Handle-request function
The entry point to the UCB is handle_request, called on line 58 in main.
Figure 4.11 shows its code. Its purpose is to “unfacet” the request (i.e. bifur-
cate if necessary, using Swap to do so), and then defer to the helper function
parse_request and its return value handler to do the actual processing. At the
call site (line 58 in main), the faceted request always has a specific shape, namely
with Undefined in the low-security facet. As a result, the bifurcation at line 124
executes the high-security path like normal (with a changed PC), and then the
low-security path is a no-op.
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This code illustrates a typical interaction between the two monads Fac and
FIO. Line 124 uses Swap to change the current monad from FIO to Fac to allow
extracting request from faceted_request on line 125. Then line 126 uses return
to change the current monad back from Fac to FIO to allow executing the action
on line 128. By using two monads, we can delimit the scope of the bifurcation to
be lines 125 to 128. The computations join back together at line 129.
Parse-request function
The parse_request function translates an incoming web request (of type
WAI.Request, imported from Haskell’s WAI library for web servers) into an appro-
priate action (of type Handler) to take in response to that request. Figure 4.12
shows its code. It duplicates some functionality (checking whether the request is
for the “login” page, checking credentials, etc.) from the policy function in the
TCB, so it would be reasonable to refactor the code to reduce redundancy. We
decided against doing so because the function names policy and parse_request
document their purposes well, whereas it is nontrivial to choose a good name for
the newly created functions and intermediate datatypes in the refactored version;
in any case, the amount of duplicated code is small.
Handler functions
The parse_request function delegates functionality to eight other functions
called Handlers, namely:
• login: sends to the client a login page.
• authentication_failed: sends a page to redirect back to the login page.
• do_create_post username content users: inserts a new post into the
database and redirects to the dashboard page.
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130 parse_request :: WAI.Request -> Handler
131 parse_request request =
132 if WAI.pathInfo request == ["login"] then
133 login
134 else case check_credentials request of
135 Nothing ->
136 authentication_failed
137 Just username -> case WAI.pathInfo request of
138 ["post"] ->
139 let content = get_parameter request "content" in
140 let permissions = get_parameter request "permissions" in
141 let users = words permissions in
142 if content /= "" && all valid_username users then
143 do_create_post username content users
144 else
145 compose_post username
146 ["dashboard"] ->
147 dashboard username
148 ["tictactoe"] ->
149 let partner = get_parameter request "partner" in
150 if valid_username partner then
151 let action = get_parameter request "action" in
152 tictactoe_play username partner action
153 else
154 tictactoe_select_partner username
155 _ ->
156 not_found
Figure 4.12: The code for the parse_request function in V1-FIO.
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• compose_post username: sends to the client a page displaying a form in
which the user can compose a new post.
• dashboard username: sends a page displaying a few links to other pages, as
well as a list of recent posts.
• tictactoe_play username partner action: updates a Tic Tac Toe game in
the database (if necessary) and sends to the client a page displaying the
current state of the game.
• tictactoe_select_partner username: sends to the client a page prompting
the user to type the name of another user.
• not_found: sends a page with “404 bad request” on it.
The Handler type is defined on line 121
type Handler = Database -> (WAI.Response -> FIO ()) -> FIO ()
and its definition means that it takes as input the database reference cells (type
Database defined on line 43) and a callback function (of type WAI.Response ->
FIO ()) whose behavior when called is to send an HTTP response to the user’s
web browser. Thanks to the code in main, the database contents are secure (inside
FIORefs) and the response callback function will not work if the current control
flow has been influenced by information that the user should not know (in that
case, the callback would behave as a no-op).
Summary
The UCB of FacetBook V1-FIO contains 352 lines: 362 in UCB.hs minus the
10 import statements at the top of the file, which are actually part of the TCB.
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4.5 V1-NoFIO
FacetBook V1-NoFIO is the next version of the code, which implements Design
V1, does not use the FIO library, and is organized so as to minimize the size of the
TCB. In this section, we highlight the differences between V1-FIO and V1-NoFIO.
4.5.1 Removing undesirable dependence on FIO
The FIO library is unnecessary in this version of FacetBook, so we can simplify
the code by removing dependence on FIO.
First, and most obviously, we remove the file FIO.hs from the codebase. As
a result, we remove all calls to Swap, which is now unnecessary due to the lack
of faceted values. Similarly, we replace uses of New, Read, and Write with uses
of newIORef, readIORef, and writeIORef, respectively. Continuing likewise, we
remove the FList datatype (which uses faceted values) and update the PostList
type definition:
157 type PostList = [(Label, Post)]
These simple changes affect the line count very little (aside from removing the
108-line FIO library).
4.5.2 Removing desirable dependence on FIO
Next, we completely remove the policy function and the lines in main that
depend on it. Figure 4.13 shows the new main function. At this point, the
functionality of FacetBook is intact, but its security guarantees have disappeared—
in particular, all posts are now visible to all users, regardless of any permission
settings on any posts. To reimplement this security feature, we define a new
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158 main :: IO ()
159 main = do --IO
160 r1 <- newIORef []
161 r2 <- newIORef []
162 let database = (r1, r2)
163 let port = 3000
164 Warp.run port $ \request respond -> do --IO
165 let unit_respond = \x -> do --IO
166 respond x
167 return ()
168 handle_request request database unit_respond
169 return ResponseReceived
Figure 4.13: The code for the main function in V1-NoFIO.
function filter_posts:
170 filter_posts :: Label -> PostList -> PostList
171 filter_posts k = filter (\(k',p) -> leq k' k)
and we call it inside the dashboard function just after reading the posts from the
database:
172 labeled_posts <- readIORef (fst database)
173 let posts = filter_posts (Whitelist [username]) labeled_posts
We must also add a line to the do_create_post function to label posts just before
they are written into the database (line 175):
174 d <- readIORef (fst database)
175 let labeled_data = ( Whitelist (username : users) ,
176 username ++ ": " ++ content )
177 writeIORef (fst database) (labeled_data : d)
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4.5.3 Minimizing the TCB
With only the changes mentioned so far, the file UCB.hs is poorly named
because it now contains code that belongs in the TCB. To rectify this situation, we
begin by moving four functions from UCB.hs to TCB.hs, namely handle_request,
parse_request, do_create_post, and dashboard. Finally, to keep the TCB as
small as possible, we must rewrite parse_request so that it uses sandboxing for
the other six types of request (besides do_create_post and dashboard). The
new code is in Figure 4.14. Line 179 defines the sandbox function, which simply
arranges for the posts to be censored from the database before calling a given
handler h. By calling it on lines 182, 185, 194, 201, 203, and 205, we avoid the
need to move any more functions from UCB.hs to TCB.hs.
Summary
In V1-NoFIO, the TCB contains 118 lines of code: 63 in TCB.hs, 45 in
Shared.hs, and 10 import statements in UCB.hs. The UCB contains 295 lines of
code: 305 in UCB.hs minus the 10 import statements at the top of the file.
Qualitatively comparing V1-FIO to V1-NoFIO is largely subjective. The
application-specific TCB is smaller in V1-FIO; on the other hand, since FIO is
part of the TCB, the total TCB size is less in V1-NoFIO.
Furthermore, the TCB code is qualitatively different in the two implementations.
In V1-FIO, the structure of the TCB (especially the policy function) relieves
auditors from digging through the codebase to find and verify security-critical
operations, such as filtering the list of posts before displaying it, and correctly
labeling new posts before inserting them into the database. On the other hand,
one can argue that the policy function complicates the control flow. The control
flow in V1-NoFIO is more straightforward, since there is no need to parse the
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178 parse_request request =
179 let sandbox h = \database respond ->
180 let censored = (undefined, snd database) in
181 h censored respond in
182 if WAI.pathInfo request == ["login"] then
183 sandbox $ UCB.login
184 else case check_credentials request of
185 Nothing ->
186 sandbox $ UCB.authentication_failed
187 Just username -> case WAI.pathInfo request of
188 ["post"] ->
189 let content = get_parameter request "content" in
190 let permissions = get_parameter request "permissions" in
191 let users = words permissions in
192 if content /= "" && all valid_username users then
193 do_create_post username content users
194 else
195 sandbox $ UCB.compose_post username
196 ["dashboard"] ->
197 dashboard username
198 ["tictactoe"] ->
199 let partner = get_parameter request "partner" in
200 if valid_username partner then
201 let action = get_parameter request "action" in
202 sandbox $ UCB.tictactoe_play username partner action
203 else
204 sandbox $ UCB.tictactoe_select_partner username
205 _ ->
206 sandbox $ UCB.not_found
Figure 4.14: The code for the parse_request function in V1-NoFIO.
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207 respond $ WAI.responseLBS status200 headers $
208 render_tictactoe new_game username partner
Figure 4.15: Excerpt of the code to display a Tic Tac Toe game in V1-FIO.
request twice.
4.6 Design V2: Adding a widget
Design V2 is the same as Design V1 except that the tictactoe page should
now also display recent posts below the Tic Tac Toe game board. Figure 4.1
highlights the design change in the screenshot of the tictactoe page.
This design change affects the information flow of FacetBook because the
tictactoe page now includes information from both portions of the database: the
posts and the games.
4.7 V2-FIO
FacetBook V2-FIO implements Design V2, uses the FIO library, and is organized
so that the change from V1 to V2 is as convenient as possible.
Figures 4.15 and 4.16 show the differences between V1-FIO and V2-FIO. Only
these lines must change to implement the new widget.
In V2-FIO, the TCB is the same as in V1-FIO. The UCB contains 8 more lines
of code.
Since the TCB is the same in V1-FIO and V2-FIO, no further changes are
needed to minimize the TCB, which suggests that the information security is no
worse than it was before. Furthermore, no special effort is required to maintain
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209 d <- Read (fst database)
210 Swap $ do --Fac
211 all_posts <- flatten d
212 return $ do --FIO
213 respond $ WAI.responseLBS status200 headers $
214 render_tictactoe new_game username partner <>
215 "<br /><br />Recent posts:<hr />" <>
216 ByteString.intercalate "<hr />" (map escape (take 20 all_posts))
217 return ()
Figure 4.16: The new code to display a Tic Tac Toe game in V2-FIO.
218 respond $ WAI.responseLBS status200 headers $
219 render_tictactoe new_game username partner
Figure 4.17: Excerpt of the code to display a Tic Tac Toe game in V1-NoFIO.
confidence in security when making the change from Design V1 to Design V2.
4.8 V2-NoFIO
FacetBook V2-NoFIO implements Design V2 without using the FIO library,
and is organized so that the change from V1 to V2 is as convenient as possible.
Figures 4.17 and 4.18 show the differences between V1-NoFIO and V2-NoFIO.
Aside from these changes, we must also remove the call to sandbox on line 202,
which ruins the carefully audited boundary between the TCB and UCB. As a
result, in V2-NoFIO, the file UCB.hs is poorly named because its contents must
now be audited for information leaks. The TCB includes the whole codebase: 429
lines of code.
Note that V2-NoFIO is still secure (thanks to the call to filter_posts on line
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220 labeled_posts <- readIORef (fst database)
221 let d = filter_posts (Whitelist [username]) labeled_posts
222 let posts = flatten d
223 respond $ WAI.responseLBS status200 headers $
224 render_tictactoe new_game username partner <>
225 "<br /><br />Recent posts:<hr />" <>
226 ByteString.intercalate "<hr />" (map escape (take 20 posts))
Figure 4.18: The new code to display a Tic Tac Toe game in V2-NoFIO.
221), just like all the other versions of FacetBook; however, the auditing effort to
confirm its information security increased significantly when we removed the call
to sandbox on line 202.
4.9 V2-NoFIO-minTCB
FacetBook V2-NoFIO-minTCB implements Design V2 without using the FIO
library, and is organized so as to minimize the size of the TCB. In this section, we
highlight the differences from V2-NoFIO.
To minimize the TCB, we must move the tictactoe_play function from
UCB.hs to TCB.hs. To keep the TCB as small as possible, we also refactor it to call
three new functions: UCB.tictactoe_error_response, UCB.update_game, and
UCB.tictactoe_play_response.
Figure 4.19 shows the new code for tictactoe_play. Lines 231 and 234 set
up appropriate sandboxes for calling the UCB functions on lines 232 and 236,
which relieves auditors from reading the code in UCB.hs (aside from its import
statements).
Compared to V1-NoFIO, the TCB is 10 lines larger, which suggests that the
change has reduced confidence in the security of the system. Compared to V2-
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227 tictactoe_play username partner action database respond =
228 if partner == username then
229 respond $ UCB.tictactoe_error_response
230 else do --IO
231 let censored_database = (undefined, snd database)
232 new_game <- UCB.update_game username partner action censored_database
233 labeled_posts <- readIORef (fst database)
234 let d = filter_posts (Whitelist [username]) labeled_posts
235 let posts = flatten d
236 respond $ UCB.tictactoe_play_response new_game username partner posts
Figure 4.19: The code for the tictactoe_play function in V2-NoFIO-minTCB.
NoFIO, we modified 4 lines, moved 6 lines, and inserted 7 new lines; these changes
were necessary to minimize the size of the TCB, suggesting that some nontrivial
effort is required to maintain confidence in security. When FIO is unavailable, the
next best sandboxing techniques lead to an inflexible architecture that becomes
outdated when requirements change.
4.10 Conclusions
To quantitatively answer the question of whether FIO makes it easier to achieve
information security, we constructed the prototype social network application
FacetBook, and measured the code changes required to add a widget for displaying
recent posts alongside the Tic Tac Toe game.
4.10.1 Research question 1
Does FIO help minimize TCB size when coding a secure application?
The FIO library has 108 lines of code, and the application-specific TCB in
V1-FIO has 99 lines of code. The application-specific TCB in V1-NoFIO has 118
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lines of code.
In terms of total size, the TCB is smaller in V1-NoFIO. On the other hand,
the code in FIO is not application-specific, and so the burden of auditing it
for correctness can be amortized over many applications. So our results our
inconclusive on this question, as FIO could be considered helpful or not, depending
on one’s point of view.
4.10.2 Research question 2
Does FIO help minimize TCB size when changing an existing application to
meet new requirements?
In the FIO version of FacetBook, the feature extension requires no significant
refactoring:
• We merely add code for getting the posts and displaying them in a widget.
The extension adds 0 lines of code to the TCB, and no special refactoring is
required.
On the other hand, in the non-FIO codebase, we have two unappealing options:
• We could simply remove the sandboxing and implement the extension without
refactoring any module boundaries. By taking this approach, we greatly
increase the size of the TCB, which now includes all of the code pertaining
to Tic Tac Toe, including all helper functions: 419 lines of code altogether.
• We could carefully refactor the modules so that we only add to the TCB the
code related to displaying the new widget; the other helper functions can
remain outside of the TCB. The net result is still a larger TCB (10 more
lines) and extra developer effort (17 changes) spent on refactoring.
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From this experiment, we conclude that the FIO library makes it possible in some
situations to extend the functionality of applications at no extra cost (in terms
of TCB lines and refactoring effort). In comparison, without FIO, this feature
extension either significantly decreases security (via a larger TCB) or requires
additional refactoring effort to mitigate such a decrease.
4.11 Discussion
One design decision is the richness of the security policy. For instance, we
could include all of the rules of the Tic Tac Toe game in the policy, thus enforcing
fair and correct playing of the game. However, since the security policy lies within
the TCB, a larger policy means greater difficulty auditing the policy itself for
correctness. Therefore, since correct functionality of the Tic Tac Toe game is less
important than enforcing post visibility settings, we choose to include in the policy
only the code pertaining to the latter criterion.
Another design choice is whether to make the policy a “transparent” wrapper
around the functioning system (analogous to higher-order contracts being projec-
tions [4] that do not modify the behavior of correct programs) or to integrate the
policy into the functioning system itself. For instance, in FacetBook, the policy
code must inspect the request parameters to determine the request’s meaning;
should this part of the code be duplicated in the functioning system, which also
needs to determine each request’s meaning? We have chosen to duplicate this
code, so there are some similarities in the control flow of functions policy and
parse_request (Figures 4.6 and 4.12).
For the database, we use the FIORef type from our FIO library to keep
persistent state in memory. For the list of ongoing Tic Tac Toe games, the FIORef
will never become faceted because that data is public for everyone to see; however,
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for the faceted list of posts, the situation is more complicated. Specifically, since
faceted execution works by refusing to update the facets that are forbidden from
seeing the effects of the currently executing code, the data structure must operate in
an append-only manner, lest we degrade performance by creating an exponentially
large faceted structure. Some work by Algehed, Russo, and Flanagan [1] will
address this performance-related limitation of faceted execution. For now, in
FacetBook, we simply use two separate FIORefs: one for the list of Tic Tac Toe
games (a non-faceted, non-append-only data structure), and one for the list of
posts (a faceted, append-only data structure).
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